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Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or Adaptive Responses?
Abstract
Economic game experiments have become a prominent method among social scientists developing and
testing theories of cooperation. These games provide a valuable opportunity to generate measures of
cooperation that can be compared from one place to the next, yet challenges remain in how to interpret cross-
cultural differences in these experiments and connect them to cooperation in naturally occurring contexts. I
address these challenges by examining framing effects in public goods games (PGGs) with salmon fishers and
reindeer herders in Kamchatka, Russia. Combining standard versions of the game with versions that refer to
post-Soviet institutions coordinating fishing and herding, I show that (1) average contributions in the PGG in
Kamchatka are substantially higher than reported elsewhere and (2) framing the PGG alters the relationship
between contributions and expectations, shifting strategies away from unconditional generosity and toward
conditional cooperation. My analysis, by synthesizing quantitative analysis of PGG data with long-term
qualitative ethnography, including extensive postgame interviews with participants, supports the notion that
cooperation in economic games increases along with cultural norms, values, and institutions that emerge from
economic interdependence. Framing effects suggest that researchers should devote more attention to
investigating the relationship between contributions and expectations.
Disciplines
Economic Theory | Regional Economics | Social and Cultural Anthropology | Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies |
Work, Economy and Organizations
Comments
Nicolas Baumard's contribution is a commentary on Drew Gerkey's "Cooperation in Context, Public Goods
Games and Post-Soviet Collectives in Kamchatka, Russia"; this commentary starts on p.163.
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/belab/3
144 Current Anthropology Volume 54, Number 2, April 2013
 2013 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved. 0011-3204/2013/5402-0003$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/669856
Cooperation in Context
Public Goods Games and Post-Soviet Collectives in Kamchatka, Russia
by Drew Gerkey
Economic game experiments have become a prominent method among social scientists developing and testing
theories of cooperation. These games provide a valuable opportunity to generate measures of cooperation that can
be compared from one place to the next, yet challenges remain in how to interpret cross-cultural differences in
these experiments and connect them to cooperation in naturally occurring contexts. I address these challenges by
examining framing effects in public goods games (PGGs) with salmon fishers and reindeer herders in Kamchatka,
Russia. Combining standard versions of the game with versions that refer to post-Soviet institutions coordinating
fishing and herding, I show that (1) average contributions in the PGG in Kamchatka are substantially higher than
reported elsewhere and (2) framing the PGG alters the relationship between contributions and expectations, shifting
strategies away from unconditional generosity and toward conditional cooperation. My analysis, by synthesizing
quantitative analysis of PGG data with long-term qualitative ethnography, including extensive postgame interviews
with participants, supports the notion that cooperation in economic games increases along with cultural norms,
values, and institutions that emerge from economic interdependence. Framing effects suggest that researchers should
devote more attention to investigating the relationship between contributions and expectations.
Understanding the factors influencing the emergence and sta-
bility of cooperation is a problem with considerable impor-
tance. Whether negotiating partnerships among individuals,
developing effective institutions, or organizing social move-
ments, people face the recurring challenge of reconciling in-
dividual and common interests. While humans appear
uniquely adept at cooperation (Richerson and Boyd 2005),
our failures often loom just as large, stimulating widespread
interest among researchers who continue to debate the
strengths of competing theories in the natural and social sci-
ences (Cronk and Leech 2013; Gintis et al. 2005; Hammerstein
2003; Nowak 2006; Ostrom 1990, 2005).
Increasingly these debates unfold across disciplinary
boundaries. Scholars from anthropology, biology, economics,
political science, psychology, and sociology (among others)
have begun to collaborate with and adopt research methods
from one another. Experiments with economic games are one
method that has become a focal point of interdisciplinary
scholarship on cooperation. While ethnographers rarely uti-
lize experiments in their research, combining economic games
with more traditional ethnographic methods provides unique
opportunities for comparative research as well as novel in-
sights on the particulars of people and place. Yet, economic
games also pose methodological and theoretical challenges.
Drew Gerkey is Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of
Anthropology, University of Washington (Seattle, Washington 98195-
3100, U.S.A. [drew.gerkey@gmail.com]). This paper was submitted
27 I 11, accepted 1 IV 12, and electronically published 4 III 13.
Many of these challenges concern the ways that ethnographers
trace connections between patterns of cooperation in the
games and patterns of cooperation in everyday life. These
connections are crucial to understanding how data from eco-
nomic games apply to theories of cooperation, so ethnogra-
phers are uniquely poised to make valuable contributions to
interdisciplinary scholarship in the social and natural sciences.
Here, I combine data from field experiments with long-
term ethnographic research on cooperation and collective in-
stitutions among salmon fishers and reindeer herders living
on the Kamchatka peninsula in the Russian Far East. Fishing
and herding are traditional subsistence strategies for indige-
nous peoples in Kamchatka, including Koryaks, Chukchis,
Evens, and Itelmens. The ecological conditions of fishing and
herding compel individuals to work together to harvest from
common-pool resources. However, the practices underlying
these subsistence strategies—and the cultural norms and val-
ues that inform them—have undergone dramatic transfor-
mations, first through Soviet-era collectivization and cultural
construction, then later in response to post-Soviet privati-
zation and perestroika. These transformations have been ex-
plicitly motivated, in part, by attempts to reconcile existing
forms of cooperation among indigenous people with the ideo-
logical imperatives of Soviet industrialization, modernization,
and the post-Soviet transition to market economies. The peo-
ple who animate contemporary collectives in Kamchatka draw
on these multiple legacies in creative ways to sustain their
lives and livelihoods in uncertain environments, where co-
operation continues to play an important role. Thus, Kam-
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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chatka provides a valuable opportunity to examine how eco-
logical, cultural, and historical conditions influence the ways
people reconcile individual and common interests.
Building on the insights of nascent anthropological research
with economic games, I explore connections between patterns
of cooperation in experimental and naturally occurring con-
texts. Specifically, I focus on post-Soviet collectives that co-
ordinate fishing and herding, examining how people’s ex-
periences with these institutions influence their decisions to
cooperate in an experiment called the public goods game
(PGG). I show that levels of cooperation in the PGG are
dramatically higher in Kamchatka than elsewhere, reflecting
the importance that people in Kamchatka place on cooper-
ation in their daily lives. Further, I find that framing the PGG
to refer to post-Soviet collectives affects patterns of cooper-
ation by altering the relationship between participants’ con-
tributions and their expectations of how much others will
contribute. I explore connections between the abstract struc-
ture of the game and the lived experiences of people in Kam-
chatka through analysis of postgame interviews, where I in-
vited participants to share their impressions of the PGG and
assist me in interpreting the results. Synthesizing my analysis
of these data with perspectives gained from 19 months of
fieldwork focused on food-sharing networks, post-Soviet in-
stitutions, and collective action movements in Kamchatka, I
suggest ways that this mixed-method approach can make the-
oretical and methodological contributions to the interdisci-
plinary study of cooperation and the ethnography of contem-
porary Siberia.
Theories of Cooperation, Economic Games,
and Culture
Developed from the theoretical perspectives and empirical
models of game theory (Binmore 2007; Gintis 2009; Maynard
Smith 1982), economic games reflect an attempt to isolate
specific factors and understand how they influence individual
decisions in the controlled context of experiments. Such fac-
tors include the structural properties of a dilemma, the range
of available options, the costs and benefits that determine the
consequences of decisions, and the information available for
assessing possible strategies and outcomes. Thus, economic
games provide opportunities to measure patterns of coop-
eration, compare them from one place to the next, and put
theories of cooperation to empirical tests. Initially wielded by
economists and political scientists working mostly with uni-
versity students in the United States, Western Europe, and
other industrialized countries, economic games soon gener-
ated data on cooperation that challenged the canonical as-
sumption that people will seek to maximize short-term, in-
dividual benefits at the expense of common interests or the
interests of others. However, these data and the theories de-
rived from them reflected only a small part of the broad range
of human ecological, social, and historical diversity. Although
anthropologists have long emphasized this shortcoming in
economic theories (Chibnik 2005), Henrich was the first to
address it by adapting economic games to conduct field ex-
periments, initially with Machiguenga forager-horticultural-
ists in Peru (2000) and later by coordinating two cross-cul-
tural, collaborative projects with ethnographers working in a
variety of small-scale societies throughout the world (Henrich
et al. 2004, 2006, 2010). These projects demonstrated quan-
titatively how patterns of cooperation vary across cultures,
convincing many skeptical researchers outside anthropology
that cultural norms, values, and institutions are important
for understanding that variation.
While Henrich et al.’s projects have contributed a number
of insights about the factors underlying cross-cultural varia-
tion in economic games, much remains to be explored. How
do patterns of cooperation in these experiments relate to pat-
terns of cooperation in naturally occurring contexts? Henrich
et al. (2004) suggested that the importance of cooperation
for people’s everyday lives could explain the cross-cultural
differences they found in levels of cooperation in economic
games. However, few studies have assessed the external va-
lidity of economic games directly by combining quantitative
measures of cooperation from experimental and naturally oc-
curring contexts. The assumption that economic games mea-
sure an individual’s or a group’s propensity to cooperate un-
derlies the prominent role of data from economic games in
many current theories of cooperation.
One way to assess the external validity of economic games
is to combine experimental data with more traditional eth-
nographic methods used to study cooperative behaviors. Two
studies that combined data from games with quantitative data
on food-sharing, time spent socializing, and contributions to
public goods (community feasts, public works projects) did
not find significant correlations between cooperative behav-
iors in experimental and naturally occurring contexts (Gurven
and Winking 2008; Hill and Gurven 2004). Gurven and Wink-
ing concluded that such results may reflect a tension between
relatively stable personality traits—such as an individual’s
propensity to cooperate, perceptions of risk, or tendency to
conform—and a variety of contextual factors that alter the
costs and benefits of cooperation—including reputation
maintenance, resource properties, possibility of punishment,
and past interactions. Other researchers have addressed the
problem of external validity by conducting games with struc-
tures that more closely parallel the real-world contexts of
cooperation that they are trying to understand, finding sig-
nificant correlations between patterns of cooperation in eco-
nomic games and both indirect (Sosis and Ruffle 2006) and
direct (Soler 2012) measures of cooperation and commitment.
Though more research is needed to understand why research-
ers find external validity in some contexts (e.g., Sosis and
Ruffle; Soler) and not in others (e.g., Gurven and Winking
2008; Hill and Gurven 2004), these results suggest that de-
cisions in economic games can reflect important dimensions
of naturally occurring cooperative behaviors.
l use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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Even when the external validity of economic games has
been established, substantial methodological challenges re-
main in understanding how the ecological, social, and his-
torical conditions that individuals face in their daily lives affect
their decisions about cooperation in experimental contexts.
While the relatively abstract structure of economic games fa-
cilitates comparative research, some have argued that this does
not preclude participants from drawing upon their own cul-
tural norms, values, and lived experiences to interpret the
structure of economic games, evaluate potential outcomes,
and adopt strategies (Hagen and Hammerstein 2006). Ens-
minger (2004), Tracer (2003), and other researchers in Hen-
rich’s cross-cultural projects provide anecdotes suggesting that
participants did make such connections, complicating at-
tempts to use data from economic games to develop and test
theories of cooperation. Ensminger (2004) reported that
Orma participants in a public goods game in Kenya spon-
taneously found congruence between the structure of the
game and harambee, an institution that coordinates individual
contributions for local community development projects.
Tracer (2003) also found intriguing evidence linking cultural
norms and values of competitive gift giving to unique patterns
of game play among Au and Gnau peoples in Papua New
Guinea. In both cases, people appeared to recognize congru-
ities between the structure of economic games and the con-
texts of cooperation that they are intimately familiar with in
their daily lives, making decisions in the games that reflect
culturally appropriate behavior in real-world settings. While
Ensminger’s and Tracer’s accounts of the cultural factors un-
derlying cooperative behavior in economic games are intrigu-
ing, their experiments were not designed to examine these
congruities explicitly, so connections between patterns of co-
operation in experimental and naturally occurring contexts
remain speculative. Determining how specific cultural norms,
values, and institutions shape perceptions of particular facets
of an economic game is difficult without research explicitly
designed to reveal these connections.
One way researchers can address this problem is through
experiments that examine “framing effects,” which are dif-
ferences in decisions that are caused by the ways participants
understand cost-benefit structures, interpret rules of the
game, use contextual cues provided by game instructions, or
identify similarities between the game, everyday life, and past
experiences (Andreoni 1995; Dufwenberg, Ga¨chter, and Hen-
nig-Schmidt 2010; Kahneman and Tversky 2000). By pairing
standard versions of economic games with versions framed
to refer to prominent cultural norms, values, and institutions
that inform cooperative behavior in naturally occurring con-
texts and then randomly assigning participants to one version
of the game, researchers can begin to understand connections
between experimental and ethnographic data.
Lesorogol (2007) did this successfully when she combined
standard dictator games among Samburu participants in
Kenya with dictator games that framed an individual’s de-
cision in the context of sharing food rather than money. Le-
sorogol found that patterns of cooperation in the framed
versions corresponded closely to Samburu norms of food
sharing, whereas contributions in standard games were less
consistent from one participant to another. Similarly, Cronk
(2007) combined a standard trust game experiment with a
version that was framed to refer to a long-term, need-based
gift-giving relationship called osotua (umbilical cord) among
Maasai men in Kenya. Contributions made by Maasai in the
standard version of the trust game reflected strategies based
on trust, investment, and reciprocity, with a positive corre-
lation between amounts of money given by one player and
amounts returned by another. Conversely, contributions in
the osotua-framed trust game reflected a greater concern for
signs of need, with a negative correlation between amounts
of money given by one player and returned by another. While
the results of the standard versions of the game appear to
support the underlying logic of trust that the game was de-
signed to test, Cronk warns that it would be wrong to apply
this logic to results from the osotua-framed trust games, which
reflect expressions of and responses to genuine need, inter-
preted according to the logic of osotua relationships.
These studies and others like them support the notion that
patterns of cooperation in economic games are sensitive to
framing effects (Brewer and Kramer 1986; Burnham et al.
2000; Cookson 2000; Cronk and Wasielewski 2008; Henrich
et al. 2004:46; Liberman et al. 2004). Economic games were
intentionally designed to create an abstract, controlled deci-
sion-making environment that would encourage participants
to consider only the rules of the game and the immediate
cost-benefit structure that the rules establish. Game instruc-
tions and protocols were carefully constructed to isolate, min-
imize, or eliminate important components of cooperation in
natural settings, such as communication, reputation, repeated
interactions, and group identity (Ostrom, Gardner, and Wal-
ker 1994). In this respect, economic games reflect the primary
interests of the researchers who designed them and the dis-
ciplines in which the games have flourished methodologically.
The abstract, controlled structure of economic games has an
important advantage: in addition to isolating the utilitarian
and rational dimensions of decision making, game structures
facilitate comparative research. However, by attempting to
isolate decisions in economic games from naturally occurring
contexts of cooperation, researchers may be simply inviting
participants to apply their own contextual frames to the games
(Hagen and Hammerstein 2006). Whether frames are explic-
itly included by the researcher or spontaneously applied by
the participants, their influence on patterns of behavior in
experimental economic games must be accounted for when
developing and testing theories of cooperation. Anthropol-
ogists are uniquely situated to turn this methodological weak-
ness of economic games into an analytic strength. By com-
bining standard versions of economic games with games that
are explicitly framed to refer to naturally occurring contexts
of cooperation, researchers can better understand how cul-
tural values, norms, and institutions influence decisions while
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also retaining the ability to compare patterns of cooperation
across space and time. In turn, ethnographers may gain new
insights about the particulars of people and place by incor-
porating economic games and other field experiments into
ongoing research with more traditional ethnographic meth-
odologies.
Framing Effects, Public Goods Games, and
Post-Soviet Collectives in Kamchatka
My research in Kamchatka examines the relationship between
cooperation in experimental and naturally occurring contexts
by making explicit connections between the abstract social
dilemmas of economic games and the lived experiences of
people in Kamchatka who played them (Gerkey 2010). Here,
I focus on results from public goods game (PGG) experiments
designed to explore framing effects by randomly assigning
participants to either a standard PGG or a PGG framed to
refer to one of two post-Soviet collective institutions, the
sovkhoz and the obshchina. The structure of the game presents
people with an opportunity to generate group benefits
through individual contributions. However, the game also
poses a social dilemma in that the group benefits are shared
equally regardless of how much an individual has contributed,
allowing low contributors to “free ride” on the contributions
of others. While cooperation is a general term that is often
applied to a variety of phenomena, the PGG has been widely
used as an analogue for contexts where tensions exist between
individual and common interests, including natural resource
management, public goods provisioning, and social move-
ments (Chong 1991; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, and
Walker 1994; Rustagi, Engel, and Kosfeld 2010). By framing
the game to refer to the sovkhoz and the obshchina, I attempt
to make this analogy explicit for people in Kamchatka. In-
formed by previous research with economic games, I was
guided by two general predictions about (1) levels of coop-
eration in experimental contexts and (2) the influence of nat-
urally occurring contexts.
Prediction 1: Contributions to the Public Good
Reindeer herding and salmon fishing in Kamchatka are in-
herently cooperative economic activities that require the co-
ordinated actions of multiple individuals. Ethnographers
working in Kamchatka prior to, during, and after the Soviet
era have emphasized many ways the cooperative character of
herding and fishing has influenced people’s notions of prop-
erty and social relationships. Cultural norms and values de-
rived from herding and fishing are evident in the words and
actions of people living in Kamchatka’s rural villages today,
extending to other contexts of cooperation such as food-
sharing networks, need-based altruism, common property,
and collective institutions. If the importance of cooperation
in people’s daily lives increases levels of cooperation in eco-
nomic games—as Henrich et al. (2004) suggest—then con-
tributions in the standard PGG should be high in Kamchatka
relative to other places where people’s economic activities are
less interdependent.
Prediction 2: Framing Effects and Collective Institutions
Despite congruence between the abstract structure of eco-
nomic games and the naturally occurring contexts they are
designed to reflect, it can be difficult to understand how these
contexts influence measures of cooperation in experiments.
For example, Ensminger suggests that Orma participants may
have been influenced by the congruence between the public
goods game and harambee institutions, resulting in relatively
higher contributions than other places in the Henrich et al.
cross-cultural study. Combining standard versions of the PGG
with versions framed to refer to post-Soviet collectives like
the sovkhoz and the obshchina allows us to examine this con-
gruence explicitly. These two institutions play important roles
in coordinating salmon fishing and reindeer herding in Kam-
chatka, embodying cultural norms and values that blend both
Soviet and pre-Soviet, Russian, and indigenous pasts. Framing
the public goods game to refer to these collectives should
encourage participants in the experiments to draw on their
experiences with these institutions when deciding how to solve
the social dilemma posed by the game. Given that we expect
people who rely on cooperation more in their daily lives to
contribute more in economic games, framing the PGG to
refer to post-Soviet collectives should strengthen the connec-
tions people make between naturally occurring contexts of
cooperation and the social dilemmas posed by the experiment,
leading to significantly higher contributions in the framed
PGG than in the standard PGG.
Collective Institutions and Legacies of
Cooperation
Putting cooperation in context entails connecting contem-
porary patterns of behavior with cultural values, norms, and
institutions of the past and present—the particulars of people
and place. Cooperation is a constant theme in the history and
ethnography of Siberia, particularly evident in collective insti-
tutions. The sovkhoz or “state farm” was developed throughout
the Soviet Union during the process of collectivization, allowing
the state to control economic production on the local level and
integrate these activities into the state economy. Sovkhoz col-
lectives were often formed by consolidating existing kolkhoz
collectives (collective farms), which were founded during the
initial stages of collectivization. Both the sovkhoz and kolkhoz
shared a similar organizational structure tied to Soviet ide-
ologies of industrialization and modernization. However, the
kolkhoz generally exhibited greater local control, while the
sovkhoz more fully exemplified the top-down flow of political
and economic authority in the Soviet Union (Humphrey
1998). Initially formed in European Russia, Soviet era col-
lectives were soon used by government officials to expand
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their control over the lives of indigenous peoples throughout
Siberia (Forsyth 1992; Slezkine 1994). Directors of sovkhoz
and kolkhoz collectives took charge of traditional subsistence
strategies like hunting, fishing, and reindeer herding, modi-
fying the scope of these activities to match the push toward
Soviet modernity (Anderson 2000; Kerttula 2000). Sovkhoz
and kolkhoz collectives were established in newly formed vil-
lages, and indigenous peoples were compelled and coerced to
inhabit them. Although Russian intellectuals had long lauded
forms of cooperation and common property among indige-
nous peoples in Siberia, even romanticizing them as “prim-
itive communists,” the early stages of collectivization entailed
substantial conflict between existing economic practices and
those the Soviet government sought to impose (Slezkine
1994). This tension was particularly evident among reindeer
herders throughout Siberia. Wealthy herders who refused to
hand over their reindeer to the sovkhoz or kolkhoz were vil-
lainized as kulaki, a Russian word meaning “fists” that was
used to describe wealthy landowners who resisted collectivi-
zation in European Russia. In both places, coercion and vi-
olence were used to transform existing property relations to
fit Soviet moral and economic ideologies. Thus, Soviet col-
lectives and the villages they supported became spaces for
implementing economic transformation and cultural con-
struction (Grant 1995; King 2011). The importance of this
legacy for understanding the lives of contemporary people in
Siberia is emphasized in a number of recent ethnographies
(Habeck 2005; Stammler 2005b; Ventsel 2006).
One unique feature of Soviet collectives was the balance
they established between individual and common interests.
Workers were compensated for their labor, but the Soviet state
retained control over the means of production and the dis-
tribution of goods. In Siberia, the state also assumed the
responsibility of providing for people who had once been
autonomous, self-reliant foragers, fishers, and herders. Once
established, Soviet collectives became “total social institu-
tions,” providing employment, housing, food, energy, trans-
portation, and a variety of public goods within the village
(Humphrey 1998). Although the conflicts of collectivization
continued in overt and subtle ways throughout the Soviet era,
it is important to appreciate the extent that many indigenous
people came to embrace their role in Soviet collectives and
rely upon the benefits they provided to the community. Thus,
when the economic reforms of perestroika pushed Soviet col-
lectives to privatize or liquidate in the late 1980s and early
1990s, the balance between individual and common interests
began to shift once more in traumatic and unpredictable ways
(Gray 2003, 2005a; King 2003a; Ziker 2003). In the region of
Kamchatka where I work, some Soviet collectives were able
to resist privatization by remaining under the oversight of
regional governments, but the financial support and subsidies
available to them decreased dramatically, making it difficult
to access markets, generate profit, and compensate workers.
Other collectives were quickly sold to newly formed private
companies, who eliminated activities that did not generate
profit and reduced employment, depriving local communities
of services and vocations they relied upon. In some cases,
Soviet collectives collapsed entirely, leaving an institutional
and economic vacuum in rural villages that had once revolved
around them.
Amid the remains of Soviet collectives, a new institution
called the obshchina has emerged. Often translated as “com-
munity” or “commune,” the term obshchina (plural obshchiny)
originally referred to prerevolutionary agrarian institutions that
coordinated property relations among peasants in European
Russia (Bartlett 1990). However, the term was also used by
early Russian ethnographers to describe the fundamental so-
cioeconomic unit of indigenous peoples throughout Siberia
prior to collectivization (Antropova 1971; Jochelson 1908;
Schweitzer 2000; Sirina 2004). In the post-Soviet context, the
obshchina is a formally recognized institution, created by a series
of laws drafted by the Russian federation beginning in 1993
and continuing to the present (Donahoe 2009; Stammler
2005a). The movement to establish obshchina collectives was
driven by community leaders, indigenous rights activists, and
ethnographers who wanted to secure formal rights to access
land and resources underlying traditional subsistence activities
and ways of life for indigenous peoples in Siberia (Fondahl
1998; Novikova 2002; Pika 1999). However, the laws estab-
lished these rights in principle, without specifying the precise
details, leading to considerable debate among community
members, government officials, and activists (Koester 2005).
The outcomes of these debates remain fluid and differ from
one region of Siberia to the next, resulting in substantial
diversity among contemporary obshchiny. An obshchina can
be founded by just a few members, or it can include an entire
village. Once an obshchina has satisfied the basic bureaucratic
requirements, its members are free to allocate resources,
rights, and obligations among themselves as they see fit. As
a result, obshchiny within a single village can differ from one
another in important ways. Still, common narratives formed
during the initial phases of the obshchina movement continue
to circulate widely throughout Siberia, emphasizing the ob-
shchina’s connections to traditional economic practices and
the cultural norms and values they are intended to sustain.
In Kamchatka, debates over the obshchina have become
particularly important because obshchina leaders and activists
have fought for and won access to industrial salmon fishing
quotas that substantially exceed the subsistence quotas
granted to all indigenous people living there (Gerkey 2011).
Obshchina collectives also coordinate reindeer herding in sev-
eral villages in the Oliutorskii District, managing reindeer that
were owned privately but kept within the collective herd dur-
ing the Soviet era. These obshchiny continue to coexist with
sovkhoz and kolkhoz collectives in a few villages, as well as
recently privatized Soviet collectives that engage primarily in
industrial salmon fishing. Though currently less profitable
economically than salmon fishing collectives, sovkhoz and ob-
shchina collectives engaged in reindeer herding support prac-
tices with tremendous symbolic importance, tied to the ways
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that many indigenous people in Kamchatka derive a sense of
common identity and purpose from their relationships with
reindeer (King 2003b). Salmon have a similar symbolic im-
portance that is strengthened further by the widespread re-
liance on summer salmon migrations that provide food and
income for people year-round in the mixed cash-subsistence
economy of Kamchatka’s rural villages. Thus, traditional sub-
sistence activities and the collective institutions that coordi-
nate them continue to play a fundamental role in people’s
lives as they adapt to the uncertainties of the post-Soviet era.
Each of these contemporary collectives embodies an over-
lapping but unique constellation of cultural norms and values
that influence social relations among their members and
within the community at large. Although the few remaining
sovkhoz and kolkhoz collectives in Kamchatka have changed
as a result of perestroika and the transition to new markets,
their continued presence in rural villages reflects an unwill-
ingness to abandon the institutional structures of labor, own-
ership, and authority established during the Soviet era (Kon-
stantinov 2002; Vladimirova 2006). At the same time, the
presence of privatized collectives that operate more or less
like any other company creates a clear contrast between So-
viet-era cultural norms and values and those that are emerging
in the post-Soviet era. Privatized collectives continue to em-
ploy village residents, but many are either denied the oppor-
tunity or choose not to seek it for practical or emotional
reasons. Positions that were once year-round are now sea-
sonal, and workers are often imported to fill jobs that village
residents could perform. Obshchina collectives have expanded
the range of possibilities, allowing indigenous peoples greater
freedom to develop their own institutional arrangements.
People have responded by shaping institutions that expand
connections between personal networks of social support and
strategies that combine elements of the formal and informal
economy in creative ways. Most obshchina collectives are
founded by close and extended kin, but they frequently in-
clude friends and business partners as well. These institutions
are also integrated into broader collective action movements,
particularly those that concern indigenous rights, access to
natural resources, and economic development (Gray 2005b).
Sovkhoz, kolkhoz, and privatized collectives also maintain con-
nections to local, regional, and national government officials
and agencies, either through budgetary support, subsidies, or
other initiatives intended to strengthen regional economies.
This institutional diversity in contemporary Kamchatka pro-
vides a unique opportunity to understand how cultural
norms, values, and institutions influence cooperation in the
experimental contexts of economic games.
Research Setting
Following the protocols established by previous researchers
who adapted public goods game experiments to field settings
(Henrich et al. 2004), I conducted single-round public goods
games in two villages, Khailino and Vyvenka, located in the
Oliutorskii District on the northern half of the Kamchatka
peninsula. In 2009, Khailino had an official population of 802
people, with about 84% belonging to one of the three major
indigenous ethnic groups: Koryaks, Chukchis, and Evens. Vy-
venka is smaller, with an official population of 460 people
(77% indigenous). Thus, people in Oliutorskii District often
refer to Khailino and Vyvenka as “ethnic villages” (nat-
sional’nye poselki) in contrast to the district administrative
center, Tilichiki, where Russians, Ukrainians, and other non-
indigenous ethnic groups are the majority (2009 population:
1,716, 29% indigenous). Both villages are located along the
Vyvenka River, with Vyvenka near the mouth of the river on
the Bering Sea and Khailino far upstream, on a tributary called
the Tilgovayam River. However, people rarely travel directly
between Khailino and Vyvenka, more often moving via Til-
ichiki, which is about 90 km through the tundra from Khail-
ino and about 45 km up the coastline from Vyvenka.
Although both reindeer herding and salmon fishing have
long been practiced in each village, only Khailino currently
has reindeer herds. Two of Khailino’s three herds are managed
by the Korfskii Sovkhoz, a Soviet-era collective that resisted
pressures to privatize during perestroika in the 1990s. The
third reindeer herd is managed by the Khailino-Vetvei Ob-
shchina, a collective formed in the early 1990s to assume
responsibility for the private reindeer owned by village resi-
dents. Despite the prominence of reindeer herding in Khail-
ino, salmon fishing also plays a very important role in the
community. The vast majority of people spend their summers
living in small camps along the Tilgovayam and Vyvenka
Rivers, harvesting and processing salmon for food and salmon
roe for sale. The prices of food in village stores are very
expensive, so dried and salted salmon, along with potatoes
and other gardened foods, are the foundation of most people’s
diets. Some indigenous people in Khailino have begun to form
smaller, kin-based obshchina collectives (rodovie obshchiny) in
order to obtain larger salmon quotas than they would oth-
erwise receive for “subsistence” purposes.
In Vyvenka, the individual practices and collective insti-
tutions associated with salmon fishing are very similar to
Khailino, with one important exception. Vyvenka is home to
a privately owned and managed fish factory, OOO Vyvenskoe,
that harvests large amounts of salmon using seine nets that
are set along the coastline on either side of the mouth of the
Vyvenka River. This company was formed in the mid 1990s
by privatizing the former Soviet collective farm, Gorky Kol-
khoz. During the Soviet era, Gorky Kolkhoz managed several
reindeer herds, but herd sizes declined rapidly during pere-
stroika, and by the late ’90s, the few deer that remained were
butchered and sold. Today, OOO Vyvenskoe is involved solely
in the production and sale of fish, after liquidating many of
the other economic activities that were formerly part of the
Gorky Kolkhoz. Some residents of Vyvenka work for OOO
Vyvenskoe to clean and process fish, but few are employed
in more lucrative jobs harvesting fish on the seine nets. For
these jobs, the company chooses instead to import seasonal
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workers from outside the village. Many of Vyvenka’s salmon
fishers who previously worked for the kolkhoz have been active
in forming obshchina collectives and lobbying for increased
salmon quotas.
Game Procedures
The experiments were conducted first in Khailino and several
weeks later in Vyvenka. A total of 70 people (42 in Khailino
and 28 in Vyvenka) volunteered to participate after learning
of the experiments through written invitations posted at
prominent places and by word-of-mouth advertisement. The
sample of participants is female-biased, with 46 women and
24 men.1 Participants were not asked to identify their ethnic
group, though the majority in both villages belonged to one
or more of the predominant indigenous groups. Because the
experiment was expected to last 2–3 hours, participants were
provided with an initial endowment of 200 rubles (≈US$8),
which was roughly equivalent to a half-day’s wage for most
people in the villages. Then participants were asked to decide
how much of this money to contribute to a group fund that
would be shared with three other people. Participants were
told that the total amount of money contributed to the group
fund would be doubled and divided equally among the four
group members, regardless of how much each person initially
contributed. Because the 200 rubles were given to participants
as one 100 ruble note, one 50 ruble note, and five 10 ruble
notes, contributing any multiple of 10 rubles between 0 and
200 rubles was possible. In order to understand the relation-
ship between participants’ decisions and their expectations
about the decisions others would make, I also asked them to
complete a short questionnaire, including (1) contribution—
the amount they wanted to contribute, (2) expected contri-
bution—the amount they expected the average person to con-
tribute, (3) free rider—whether or not they thought at least
one person would contribute 0 rubles to the group, (4) al-
truist—whether or not they thought at least one person would
contribute 200 rubles to the group, and (5) relevance—
whether or not they thought the game was similar to situations
that they faced in their daily lives. Participants were told that
their contributions and answers to the questionnaire would
be confidential, and that only I would know the identities of
group members.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three ver-
sions of the public goods game: (1) a standard version whose
structure was similar to games used elsewhere by other re-
searchers, (2) a version framed to refer to the sovkhoz, and
1. During postgame interviews, I attempted to find an explanation for
the female-biased sample, but no consensus emerged among the partic-
ipants. By including a variable for participants’ sex in the regression
models (table 2), I was able to examine whether or not the female-biased
sample influenced model estimates. The models do not predict that a
participant’s sex has any significant influence on contributions nor do
they suggest that including sex as a control variable alters the significance
of other factors.
(3) a version framed to refer to the obshchina. Before playing,
participants in each version left the main room and entered
a game room, where instructions and examples were read to
them.2 The instructions included a description of the game
rules, four examples of how the game might be played, and
what the results would be in each scenario. These instructions
and examples were identical in all three versions of the game,
with only two exceptions. First, in the standard version, par-
ticipants were asked to contribute to a “group fund,” but in
the framed versions, they were asked to contribute to either
a “sovkhoz fund” or an “obshchina fund.” Second, each of the
framed versions began with the sentence: “This game is called
the sovkhoz/obshchina game.” When all questions had been
answered and people felt they understood the game, each
person was handed an envelope containing the short ques-
tionnaire and 200 rubles. While one version of the game was
in progress, the other people watched a film and waited in
the main room. The participants were asked several times to
refrain from discussing the game with anyone until after the
experiment had been completed, and research assistants mon-
itored people in both rooms to ensure that this rule was
followed. In each village, the standard PGG was played first,
the sovkhoz PGG played second, and the obshchina PGG third.
All participants were informed that in order to calculate earn-
ings group members would be drawn randomly once everyone
had completed the experiment.3 Participants were reminded
that their group could include people who played before,
alongside, or after them. A total of 23 people played the
standard version, 22 played the sovkhoz version, and 25 played
the obshchina version.4
Results A: Experiments
Result 1: High Contributions
Across all versions of the public goods game, contributions
in Kamchatka were much higher than contributions reported
in other parts of the world. Overall, participants contributed
an average of 89% of their initial endowment to the group.
The mean contribution was high because about 77% of the
participants chose to contribute their entire endowment to
2. All instructions were read from a script translated independently
by two trained translators. The first translated the script from English to
Russian, and the second back-translated the Russian version into English
to check for errors.
3. In Khailino, there were 42 participants, so for the two extra par-
ticipants, two players from other groups were chosen randomly, and their
contributions were used to calculate earnings for the extra group. Earn-
ings for the two players chosen for a second group were calculated based
only on their first group.
4. I attempted to assign an even number of participants in each village
to each version of the PGG, but three participants in Khailino were unable
to complete the experiment, leaving 12 in the sovkhoz version and 15 in
the standard and obshchina versions. In Vyvenka, 28 people participated,
leaving 8 in the standard version and 10 in the sovkhoz and obshchina
versions.
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Figure 1. Frequency of individual contributions in standard and framed public goods games.
the group. Among the lower offers, only three were below
50% of the initial endowment (fig. 1).
Previous research with public goods games shows that av-
erage contributions are usually between 40%–60% of the en-
dowment (Henrich et al. 2004; Herrmann, Ga¨chter, and
Tho¨ni 2008; Ledyard 1995). Experiments with public goods
games have been conducted in several urban and rural cities
in Russia, reporting average contributions of 35%, 52%, and
55% (Ga¨chter and Herrmann 2009; Ga¨chter, Herrmann, and
Tho¨ni 2004; Herrmann, Ga¨chter, and Tho¨ni 2008). The high-
est average contribution published in a one-shot public goods
game or in the first round of a repeated public goods game
that I have found is 72%, which was reported among residents
of poor urban communities in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
(cited in Cardenas and Carpenter 2008). Thus, to my knowl-
edge, contributions in the public goods game in Kamchatka
are higher than in any other part of Russia and also higher
than any other place in the world where this experiment has
been conducted (table 1).
The questionnaire about participants’ expectations for how
others would play the game provides additional insights.
Overall, participants expected the average person to contrib-
ute 64% of the endowment; 93% of participants thought there
would be a person who gave his or her entire endowment to
the group, while 68% thought that there would be a person
who gave nothing to the group; 83% of participants thought
that the game was similar to situations that they encountered
in their daily lives.
Result 2: Framing Effects
Average contributions were 97.4% in the standard version of
the game, 87.5% in the sovkhoz version, and 83.2% in the
obshchina version. Comparing the distribution of contribu-
tions in the three versions shows that levels of cooperation
in the standard version were significantly higher than the
sovkhoz version (Mann-Whitney U: z p 1.968, P p .049)
and marginally higher than the obshchina version (Mann-
Whitney U: z p 1.822, P p .068). However, there is no
significant difference between contributions in the sovkhoz
and obshchina versions (Mann-Whitney U: z p 0.093, P p
.926). This suggests that framing the games to refer to post-
Soviet collectives slightly but significantly decreases contri-
butions in the public goods game. In order to investigate these
framing effects further, I constructed a series of OLS regres-
sion models, with the percentage of the endowment contrib-
uted to the group as the dependent variable (table 2). Because
there was no statistically significant difference between con-
tributions in the two framed versions, they were combined
and compared to standard versions using a dichotomous var-
iable in the regression models. Additional independent var-
iables were included that recorded the village where the games
were played, as well as the age and sex of the participants.
Four variables measuring expectations were also included,
corresponding to the answers provided on the game question-
naire.
The regression models show significant framing effects,
even when control and expectations variables are included
(table 2, model 3). The amount of money that a participant
expected others to contribute also has a significant, positive
correlation with contributions in the public goods game
(models 2 and 3). Among the control variables, neither the
village residence (b p 1, P p .864) nor sex (b p 3.2, P p
.605) of a participant has any significant correlation with
contributions. However, there is a marginally significant cor-
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Table 1. Mean contributions in public goods game (PGG) experiments throughout the worlda
Participants Mean (%) Group size MPCRb Rounds Country Citation
Kamchatka (standard) 97 4 .5 1 Russia Gerkey (this article)
Kamchatka (framed) 85 4 .5 1 Russia Gerkey (this article)
Samara (students) 55 4 .4 10c Russia Herrmann, Ga¨chter, and
Tho¨ni (2008)d
Kursk and Zheleznogorsk 52 3 .5 1 Russia Ga¨chter, Herrmann, and
Tho¨ni (2004)
Belgorod and Yekaterinburg
(students)
35 3 .5 1 Russia Ga¨chter and Herrmann
(2009)
Ho Chi Minh City 72 4 .5 5e Vietnam Cardenas and Carpenter
(2008)f
Bangkok 61 4 .5 5e Thailand Cardenas and Carpenter
(2008)f
Orma 58 4 .5 1 Kenya Ensminger (2004)g
Huinca 58 5 .4 1 Chile Henrich and Smith
(2004)g
Tsimane 54 4 .5 1 Bolivia Gurven (2004)g
Salvador da Bahia 48 4 .5 1 Brazil Soler (2012)
Ache 45 5 .4 1 Paraguay Hill and Gurven (2004)g
Shona 45 5 .4 3h Zimbabwe Barr (2001)
Mapuche 33 5 .4 1 Chile Henrich and Smith
(2004)g
a A full review of all studies using public goods games is beyond the scope of this table. I have included studies that meet one of two criteria: (1)
public goods games conducted in Russia or (2) public goods games conducted by researchers working with nonstudent participants in the field.
b Marginal per capita return (MPCR) on individual contribution to public good.
c The mean contribution reported here for Samara is from the first round of a 10-round PGG.
d See Herrmann, Ga¨chter, and Tho¨ni (2008) for data from a cross-cultural study with public goods games among university students in 15 countries.
e The mean contributions reported here for Ho Chi Minh City and Bangkok apparently include data from all five rounds of the PGG.
f The data reported here are presented in Cardenas and Carpenter (2008), but the citation for these studies is Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi
(2004).
g Published in Henrich et al. (2004).
h The mean contribution reported here for Shona is from the first round of a three-round PGG.
relation between age and contributions, with older partici-
pants contributing more than younger participants (b p .4,
P p .059).
Examining the distribution of contributions in each version
of the game in relation to the amount that people expect
others to contribute suggests that there may be an interaction
between individuals’ expectations and their contributions (fig.
2). Plotting the relationship between expectations and con-
tributions allows us to identify the strategies individuals chose
in the public goods game.
A large percentage of participants in each version adopted
a strategy of generosity, contributing 100% of their endow-
ments regardless of how much they expected others to con-
tribute. However, there are also many participants who ap-
peared to adopt a strategy of conditional cooperation,
contributing the same amount of money that they expected
others to contribute. Although there are some participants
who fall on the continuum between generosity and condi-
tional cooperation, only two people adopted a strategy of
selfishness, contributing less than he or she expected others
to contribute.
This relationship can be examined statistically in the re-
gression models by adding an interaction term between frame
and expected contribution (table 2, model 4). The marginal
statistical significance of the interaction term (P p .066)
suggests that framing a game to refer to post-Soviet collectives
may have altered the relationship between an individual’s con-
tribution in the public goods game and his or her expectations
about how much others would contribute. In other words,
contributions made by participants in framed versions of the
game appear to be influenced by their expectations about how
much others will contribute. Many people who expected oth-
ers to give less than 100% of their endowment decided to
contribute less than 100% themselves. The same does not
appear to be true in the standard versions of the game, al-
though this result may be driven by the fact that only 2 of
23 participants in the standard version contributed less than
100% of their endowment. The relatively small sample sizes
in each frame, combined with the marginal significance of
the interaction term, suggest a cautious interpretation of this
result.
Results B: Postgame Interviews
How Did Players Interpret the Game?
Following the games, I sought out people who had played,
listened to them describe their strategies, and asked for their
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Figure 2. Frequency of individual contributions and expected contributions of others in (a) standard, (b) framed, and (c) all public
goods games. Size of markers reflects the number of observations, with labels for all values 11. Lines represent bivariate regression
estimates for individual contribution (dependent variable) and expected contribution. A conceptual diagram (d) illustrates lines for
(x) unconditional generosity, (y) conditional cooperation, (z) and selfishness.
help in explaining the unusually high contributions. We also
discussed their impressions of the people who contributed
less than others, how the structure of the game could be
modified to yield more interesting results, and what relevance
the game had for their lived experiences in Kamchatka. While
the interviews provided many insights on patterns of coop-
eration in the games, they also established new dialogues that
helped me understand the ecological, cultural, and historical
conditions of cooperation and collective action in Kamchatka.
Sitting together drinking tea in her kitchen, my neighbor
Anna explained to me, “I understood the point as how much
people trust each other.”5 We had been neighbors for several
months but had done little more than greet each other as we
entered and exited the building or passed each other on the
streets of the village. This was the first time I had been invited
into her apartment. I asked her why she thought trust was
important. “Well, how to explain it,” she said, laughing: “Well,
for example, now I think, ‘I contribute these 200 rubles, and
others might not contribute anything, and what would I get
out of it?’ Well, it ended up that I, and many others in my
group, we trusted each other. So, everyone thought to them-
selves, ‘I could contribute nothing.’ But we all simply knew
what people would do. There was trust. I simply trusted peo-
ple.”
Many other people shared Anna’s sentiments. When I asked
5. All names used in this article are pseudonyms.
if they were afraid that others in their group would make low
contributions, most acknowledged the concern but quickly
discounted or dismissed it. A man named Dima told me,
“Well, yes, there was of course a doubt that there would be
people who wouldn’t give anything in general or only half.
But I thought that the majority would give more.” Before I
told him about the results of the games, Dima guessed cor-
rectly that only “a pair of people, five maximum” gave very
little. A woman named Galina responded to the same question
with shock and amusement: “Definitely not! I looked around
and thought, ‘Now, everyone will contribute everything.’ I
watched people and thought who might contribute, who
might not, approximately.” These responses suggest that the
high contributions in Kamchatka reflect optimism about the
willingness of others to contribute to the public good. But is
the opposite also true? Did those who contributed less express
a lack of trust in others?
One person who contributed less than others, Artur, told
me that he decided to give 150 rubles to the group and keep
50 for himself “as insurance . . . because it’s possible that my
partner won’t contribute anything!” Artur went on to explain
that his decision was influenced by the fact that groups were
drawn randomly. If he had known exactly who would be in
his group, he might have contributed the full amount. I in-
terviewed two other men who contributed less than 200 rubles
(one gave 100, the other 150), and each had a similar expla-
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nation about wanting to make sure that they left the game
with some money for themselves. Even some people who
contributed their entire endowments speculated that this con-
cern for “insurance” could explain why others made lower
contributions.
Data on individual contributions and expectations in Kam-
chatka are consistent with high levels of trust and strategies
of conditional cooperation. Only two people who played the
game contributed less than they expected others to give (fig.
2). This suggests that very few people attempted to take ad-
vantage of high contributions by increasing their own earnings
at the expense of other group members. I interviewed one of
these people, a woman in her twenties named Nadia. She
explained that she had chosen to contribute only 50 rubles
because she expected others to contribute much more and
calculated that she could earn more money that way. Nadia
was one of several people in the village who gathered in the
evenings a few times a week to play cards for money, and she
applied a similar mentality to the public goods game. Listen-
ing to Nadia, I heard pride in her voice but also a bit of
embarrassment because she had benefited at the expense of
others who had approached the game with a more cooperative
mentality. As the results in figure 2 show, a large percentage
chose a strategy of generosity, contributing more than they
expected others to give. Trust and conditional cooperation do
not seem to explain this generosity entirely.
Perhaps people did not view their contributions as confi-
dential decisions in a one-shot environment but as decisions
influenced by past obligations and entailing future ramifi-
cations. Each of the statements above indicates that partici-
pants drew upon their experiences living with other people
in the village when choosing a strategy in the game, whether
these experiences encouraged them to trust others, seek in-
surance, or calculate in favor of self-interest. This raises two
possibilities that may explain the unusually high contributions
in Kamchatka. First, the interaction between the methodology
of the game and people’s lived experiences may have artifi-
cially increased contributions. Care was taken to develop game
protocols that would be sensitive to local notions of privacy,
social relationships, and uses of money, so that an individual’s
decision in the experiment would reflect his or her propensity
to cooperate. However, economic games had never been con-
ducted in these communities, so it was difficult to know in
advance precisely how people would react to game protocols.
It is possible that methodological factors led to more coop-
eration in the public goods game than would be observed in
naturally occurring contexts in these villages. Second, partic-
ipants may have used cultural norms and values of interde-
pendence developed in naturally occurring contexts to choose
strategies in the public goods game. In this case, the high
contributions in Kamchatka do accurately reflect existing pro-
pensities and patterns of cooperation. Data from postgame
interviews speak to each of these possible explanations. Al-
though people’s post hoc statements about their own and
others’ behaviors must be analyzed cautiously, they do provide
unique insights that are particularly helpful in tracing con-
nections between patterns of cooperation in experimental and
natural contexts.
Methodological Factors
The confidential, context-free structure of economic games
is intended to produce a baseline measure of cooperation that
can be compared from one place to the next. However, this
approach also makes it challenging for researchers to identify
and understand the factors underlying cross-cultural variation
in game play. The rules of the game may be the same, but
how can we know if individuals in different places understand
and act upon them similarly? Postgame interviews can reveal
some of the factors that influenced participants’ decisions,
guiding researchers to areas where methodological innova-
tions may yield more accurate interpretations. My interviews
raised issues about perceptions of confidentiality, attitudes
toward risk, and notions of property among participants that
suggest how their lived experiences informed their actions in
the public goods games.
Although I assured participants several times that their
identities and decisions in the games would be confidential,
I also observed participants openly discussing the contribu-
tions they made with one another after the game was over.
One woman even walked from person to person, chiding
them gently when their reported contributions did not match
her expectations. My neighbor Anna also alluded to the lack
of perceived confidentiality, explaining “What would people
think [about me] if I didn’t contribute, and they know I didn’t
contribute? How are they going to look at me then?” I re-
minded her about my promise of confidentiality, and she
replied, “It has nothing to do with you! The players themselves
would discuss it afterward.”
At first, these remarks appear to explain the high level of
contributions in Kamchatka. However, public goods games
have been played in many places similar to Khailino and
Vyvenka, where participants know one another and will en-
counter each other often after the game. Still, contributions
in these places do not reach the level that they do in Kam-
chatka (table 1). This difference may be due to cultural values
and norms of privacy. As Anna’s words suggest, even when
the structure of the experiment promises confidentiality, re-
fusing to divulge information about one’s decisions when the
experiment is over may be considered unusual or unaccept-
able in these villages, regardless of the rules of the game.
Although researchers design economic games to ensure an-
onymity or confidentiality, we may need to develop new meth-
ods for understanding the extent to which people in a given
place perceive the experiment as a space where decisions are
truly without ramifications for personal reputations and re-
lationships. Studies that vary the degree of anonymity or con-
fidentiality have shown that contributions are generally higher
when decisions are public (Barr 2001; Gurven, Zanolini, and
Schniter 2008; Hill and Gurven 2004; Lamba and Mace 2010),
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but cross-cultural variations in people’s perceptions of con-
fidentiality in experimental contexts more generally have not
been explored.
Similarly, the extent that people emotionally or materially
value what is at stake in different possible outcomes may vary
from place to place. Several people that I interviewed did not
explain their understanding of the game primarily in terms
of trust but emphasized “risk” instead. When asked about the
possibility that others in the group might not contribute,
many replied that they were not afraid to risk such a small
amount of money when there was a clear common benefit
of contributing. A Russian man named Vova expressed this
view succinctly: “If you compare it to life, these kinds of
moments exist, do you understand? Someone contributes,
someone doesn’t. Only those who contribute can benefit, but
you can also go bankrupt. Economists can figure it all out.
But in life it’s true that people who don’t contribute don’t
receive anything. Do you understand?”
Vova’s remarks indicate two important points to consider
when applying the results of economic games to theories of
cooperation. First, people faced with making decisions in
games may not use backward induction to arrive at income-
maximizing strategies, instead relying on heuristics or biases
that reflect naturally occurring contexts of cooperation (Gig-
erenzer and Selten 2002). Participants in Kamchatka may have
chosen strategies that reflect their attitudes about risk devel-
oped through experiences in a variety of contexts where they
need to act despite the fact that the outcome is uncertain and
the consequences significant. Second, the amount of money
at stake in an economic game may represent different levels
of perceived risk for participants in different places. Following
previous research with economic games, the size of the initial
endowment in these experiments was standardized to the
equivalent of about a half-day’s wage in Khailino and Vy-
venka. In an objective sense, this amount of money is sig-
nificant for people in these villages. Even so, as a woman
named Larisa put it, “I receive 500 rubles per day in salary.
For me, all the same, it’s not money.” Larisa’s comment re-
flects the fact that many people in Kamchatka’s rural villages
do not rely on money in the way that people living in larger
cities do. Although people value and seek the limited op-
portunities for wage labor in the village, they are also accus-
tomed to coping with income fluctuations by expanding pro-
duction of subsistence foods, particularly since the collapse
of the Soviet economy (Crate 2006; Ziker 2002). Indeed, one
can understand Larisa’s feelings about her 500 ruble daily
salary after visiting the village stores, where prices are rou-
tinely as high as or higher than in Moscow, one of the most
expensive cities in the world.
After hearing comments like Larisa’s, I began to ask people
how they might play the game differently if the initial en-
dowment were larger. What if people had been given endow-
ments of 2,000 rubles (about US$80), rather than 200 rubles?
Many people speculated that larger endowments would not
substantially decrease contributions to the group. These are
only hypothetical statements, but they do echo the results of
high-stakes economic games in other places (Camerer 2003).
When I asked a man named Aleksandr if he would still con-
tribute 100% of his endowment if it were 2,000 rubles, he
did not waver: “Yes, it’s chuzhie money! It’s not my blood,
my earned money! . . . For me, there’s no kind of emotion
because it’s not my money, it’s chuzhie money.”
Aleksandr’s use of the word chuzhie to describe the game
endowment is interesting. In Russian, the adjective chuzhoi
(plural chuzhie) refers to an object that belongs to somebody
else or something that is “strange” or “foreign.” Interestingly,
chuzhoi is also used in opposition to the word svoi, which
describes something that belongs to a person, including per-
sonal relationships among friends and family. Many foreigners
who visit Russia place a great deal of importance on this
distinction. They arrive without close friends or family and
are treated as chuzhoi until they are accepted into a circle of
Russian friends and treated as svoi. I clearly recall one instance
during my fieldwork in Kamchatka when a person with whom
I had recently traveled to visit the reindeer herds in the tundra
far outside Khailino was introducing me to another person
in the village. The new person was shy and hesitant to talk
to me, but my new friend reassured him by saying, “Don’t
worry, he’s already svoi!”
Despite the fact that the game instructions emphasized that
the 200 ruble endowments were given to the players and
should be considered their own property, some people did
not easily accept this. A young man named Danil felt that
the game would be improved if this point were made more
emphatically: “You thought that people consider these 200
rubles [their own]. It’s apparent that some people didn’t un-
derstand. How? 200 rubles, fallen from the sky? Of course, I
didn’t earn them. You should have done it differently some-
how, in order to explain to people that this money, these 200
rubles, they earned them. It’s their money.”
Like Danil, Marina felt that the individual endowments
represented a windfall, exclaiming “like manna falls from the
sky, from the sky to the sovkhoz!” Marina’s words parallel
suggestions from past experiments that participants in eco-
nomic games may treat endowments as windfalls that are
obtained without cost (Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren 2005;
Gurven 2004). Pressing Aleksandr further, I asked him if he
would change his mind if the stake were raised to 20,000
rubles (about US$800)? He smiled, “Well, then everyone
would think it over! That’s already a little bit of money! Free
money, but money!” Still, he expected that people would
continue to contribute a large portion of their endowments.
He smiled, “Risk, as they say, is a noble act.”
Aleksandr’s comments about risk were echoed by a woman
named Vera and her daughter Oksana, who suggested that
people’s lives in Kamchatka involve a level of risk that is
greater than that experienced by people in other places. Vera
and Oksana live in Vyvenka, located on a part of the coastline
that is usually only accessible in winter by snowmobile and
in summer by boat. Traveling by foot requires one to traverse
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a rough and rocky shore for about 10–15 hours. When the
weather is good, most people make the journey in 2–3 hours
by water, using small, 15–20 foot fishing boats, powered by
30–45 horsepower motors. Months before playing the games,
on my first summer trip to Vyvenka, I traveled this way with
Oksana’s husband, Viktor. The trip was uneventful, and after
we arrived, sitting in Vera’s kitchen drinking tea, Oksana asked
me if I had been afraid. When I said that I was not, she
replied, “That’s because you have never done it before. You
don’t know how dangerous it is.”
Every summer, people traveling by boat between Vyvenka
and Tilichiki drown as a result of bad weather, equipment
malfunction, lack of skill, poor judgment, or some combi-
nation of these. In fact, later that summer, I learned this lesson
in a very personal way. Vova—the Russian man who told me
that both the game and life involved risk but that one needed
to take risks in order to benefit—went missing on a trip from
Vyvenka to Tilichiki. Earlier that same day, I had made the
trip in the opposite direction, traveling again with Viktor. I
was sitting with Vova’s family later that evening when I learned
that they had not heard from him. For the next few days,
there was no word about him or the friend with whom he
had been traveling. Over the next few weeks, the family called
everyone they could think of, but no one had seen either of
them. To this day, no one has.
Vera and Oksana explained that people are accustomed to
living with this kind of risk because they have no other choice.
Trips from Vyvenka to Tilichiki are often necessary to pur-
chase supplies, receive official documents, register for salmon
quotas, visit the hospital, and for many other reasons. During
the Soviet era, helicopters regularly flew from village to village,
but now these flights occur only once or twice a week at best,
even in the most accessible villages. In a village like Vyvenka,
it is quite common to spend 3 weeks and never see a helicopter
land. This isolation is one of the primary difficulties that
people in Kamchatka’s rural villages face in the post-Soviet
era. Several people told me the story of how Vyvenka’s elec-
trical station broke down in the mid 1990s. For 2 years the
necessary part did not arrive. A few people were able to use
small gasoline powered generators sparingly, but most ad-
justed their lives to make do without electricity. In this con-
text, Vera and Oksana said, the risk of losing 100 rubles in
an economic game did not weigh so heavily, particularly when
one expects others to make high contributions as well.
These data from postgame interviews indicate that percep-
tions of confidentiality, notions of property, and attitudes
toward risk among participants may explain in part the high
contributions in Kamchatka. Although the rules of the game
promised participants confidentiality, the authority behind
this promise diminished as soon as the game was over, su-
perseded by local norms and values of privacy. Similarly, the
game instructions implored participants to consider the
money they were given as their own, but some people treated
it instead as a windfall that could be risked more easily than
money they had earned. For some, the objective significance
of the money at stake was overcome by the economic obstacles
and environmental uncertainties that they face daily. Each of
these methodological factors may have increased contribu-
tions in the public goods games in Kamchatka. Yet, none of
them seem sufficiently unique to this particular place that
they could entirely explain such high contributions to the
public good.
Cultural Norms and Values of Interdependence
Instead of being surprised that contributions in Kamchatka
were so high, many people I spoke with were surprised to
learn that contributions in other parts of the world were so
much lower. When I told Anna that average contributions in
public goods games elsewhere usually fall between 40%–60%,
she speculated that the small size of her village could explain
the higher contributions there. Anna noted the fact that most
people had grown up together and knew each other well as
a source of their confidence and trust in one another. I ex-
plained that previous studies included places that were similar
to Khailino and Vyvenka, even some much smaller in size.
“And all the same, you mean there was such a small per-
centage?” she replied. I nodded and she smiled, adding: “I
don’t know. That means people simply don’t trust each other.
No, in general, we have a village with a lot of trust. We have
it better in terms of trust.”
When I asked people how they would understand and ex-
plain the uniqueness of the game results in Kamchatka, many
told me about the importance of cultural norms and values
of interdependence, altruism, and reciprocity. Indeed, many
people I spoke with during the course of my fieldwork, in-
digenous and Russian alike, cited the prevalence of these
norms and values as the main reason why they would never
seriously consider moving away from the village. Even though
moving to the regional capital, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii, or
another part of Russia might alleviate some of the economic
hardships they face, they would lose the social support and
sense of camaraderie that define the best parts of life in rural
villages for people in Kamchatka.6
Artur explained this to me by making an analogy between
widespread ethics of reciprocity and a common, important
economic activity: planting potatoes in one’s garden. “You
plant a potato, you grow not one potato, you grow many.
That is, a person does a good deed and later receives even
more good deeds.” Artur suggested that this ethic is an es-
sential part of the “traditional upbringing” (natsional’oe vos-
pitanie) of indigenous people in the village, and also serves
as a kind of “spiritual law” (dukhovnyi zakon) that is “even
in the blood of our northern people.” Irina, a former school-
teacher, echoed Artur’s explanation:
From their spirit! From their spirit, simply! Because people,
our village, anyone who has misfortune or is unhappy, they
6. See Thompson 2003 for similar sentiments in a neighboring region,
Chukotka.
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give their last to them. . . . And everyone interacts with one
another. Because in the North, I say, a loner doesn’t survive.
That’s why we support each other. We help each other. And
with this experiment, with money all the same, no one took
it all [for themselves]. Because then it’s possible that some-
one needs that money.
Irina added that she knew of one woman who kept 100
rubles for herself because, as she explained to Irina, she needed
money to buy milk powder for her child. To Irina, the
woman’s lower contribution to the group was not an ex-
pression of selfishness but of need. Indeed, “need” was the
most common response that I received to questions about
why a person would contribute less than 200 rubles to the
group.
Interpreting low contributions as expressions of need also
influenced people’s willingness to cooperate in the presence
of lower contributors. When I asked Dima, “Would you still
have contributed 200 rubles if you had known that someone
in your group would give very little?” he said, “Yes. All the
same, I would have given.” I rephrased my question, “Even
if you knew that he would earn more as a result of keeping
more for himself?” Dima replied, “Well, he probably doesn’t
have enough of something.” Aleksandr said simply, “Consider
that I have 1,000 rubles or nothing, all the same I live. Con-
sider 5,000 rubles or none, it makes no difference to me. We
have this kind of mentality that emerges here in the North.”
I began to ask Aleksandr if people felt that money was not
as important as personal relationships, but before I could
finish the question, he continued:
Well, everyone here thinks money is necessary, but we all
come to each other’s aid. Any kind of drunkard or alcoholic,
all the same we help. They arrive hungry, “Here, eat!” “Give
me salted, dried fish.” “Here!” “Give me cabbage.” “Here!”
“Give me bread.” “Here!” “Give me vodka, 100 rubles.”
“Here!” When money arrives, you hand it out, you buy
things. You buy things, you hand it out. No difference! We
don’t have that kind of harsh buy and sell like other people
in Tilichiki.
By contrasting the ethic of helping those in need with the
“harsh buy and sell” of Tilichiki, Aleksandr suggests that these
ethics are rooted in differences between an “ethnic village”
like Khailino, and a village like Tilichiki that is populated
primarily by nonindigenous people. This contrast implies that
indigenous cultural values and norms, which are more prom-
inent in Khailino, may have a greater influence on levels of
cooperation in the game than those that reflect the Soviet/
Russian past that the two villages share. The predominance
of these ethics in Khailino could be due to the difference in
scale between larger and smaller villages, the tendency for
nonindigenous residents to adopt indigenous norms and val-
ues while living in smaller villages, or some combination of
these.
Irina made a similar connection between the game results
and several other examples of indigenous cultural values in
action. She talked about the widespread practice of keeping
shared hunting cabins that are scattered throughout the tun-
dra stocked with dry wood and supplies. When a person
arrives, they are free to make use of these amenities, but they
are also obligated to replenish them before they leave. As she
spoke, I recalled traveling with fishers in Vyvenka and staying
in these cabins. When I asked one of the men I was traveling
with why people did not lock their cabins, he explained that
the risks of traveling far from villages in the tundra meant
that resources should be kept available for people in need.
What if there is a blizzard and someone is lost and needs
shelter? What happens if the cabin is locked and they cannot
get in? He explained that some people in the village had begun
to lock their cabins, and that this should be considered a
crime. He felt strongly that helping a person in need was
more important than securing personal property against pos-
sible abuse by unscrupulous travelers.
For Irina, this ethic connects to generous contributions in
the game:
All the time, leave something behind in the tundra, because
there should be reciprocity (vzaimopomoshch). And for that
reason, nevertheless, I was confident that you wouldn’t find
the kind of person who wouldn’t contribute anything to the
[group].
She continued,
Because without helping each other, we cannot survive in
the North. And that’s why everyone tries to help. . . . That’s
the kind of people we have. Kamchatka is special, this land.
In addition to trusting that others playing the game would
make high contributions, people in Kamchatka conceptual-
ized the few who did not contribute as in need of help. Low
contributors were occasionally described as immoral free rid-
ers, but even then people found these actions humorously
ironic and macabre, rather than feeling indignant. Far more
often, low contributors were described as people who prob-
ably needed money to support themselves or their family. The
words of Irina, Dima, Aleksandr, and others suggest that gen-
erous players understood their contributions as altruistic acts,
similar to replenishing the supply of wood in a shared hunting
cabin or providing food to a neighbor in need. These altruistic
acts are seen as essential components of people’s ability to
adapt to challenging and uncertain environments, as well as
expressions of their sense of cultural identity and community.
Perhaps the connections people saw between these cultural
norms and values of interdependence and the structure of the
public goods game explain the uniquely high contributions
in Kamchatka.
Defection, Nostalgia, and Post-Soviet Collectives
I chose to conduct experiments with economic games in Kam-
chatka not only because I was interested to learn how people’s
behavior would compare to other parts of the world but also
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because I thought the games might help me better understand
how people in Kamchatka thought about cooperative rela-
tionships. Compared to other economic games, the public
goods game is particularly well suited as an analogue to real-
life situations that present people with an opportunity to work
together to achieve a common goal. But like “real life,” the
game also poses an important dilemma: individuals who do
not contribute to the common good—so-called free riders—
can nonetheless benefit from the contributions of others.
For some people, this aspect of the games reminded them
of instances where local people had been taken advantage of
by others. When I asked my neighbor Anna why she con-
tributed the full 200 rubles to the group, she told me that
she trusted other people. But in the next breath, laughing a
bit, she added, “In general, I trust. I am too trusting!” I asked
her if she had experienced any problems as a result. She
answered, “There are situations when you believe and it ends
up that people let you down.” She began to have difficulty
finding the right words, “All this . . . in money. . . . I’m left
back where I started. . . . Well . . . no matter. . . . Not everyone
is like that. . . . Most are like . . . normal people . . . who
answer for their words.” Anna was still laughing as she spoke,
but her smile was strained. Later, as we discussed possible
connections between the game and everyday life in Kam-
chatka, she returned to the theme of trust:
But here it ends up that without trust there won’t be any
kind of reciprocity. In order to help, you have to trust. . . .
Even if you don’t trust, you help all the same. What are
you going to do? Our people, for example, our ethnic groups
[natsional’nosti]: Koryaks, Chukchis. We trust too much,
and others use that. Well, I don’t know. If we trusted less,
maybe it would be easier for us to live with such people,
people who don’t answer for their words. . . . And us? They
simply gather us up and throw us away. How many situ-
ations were there like this? All the same, we continue to
trust. We don’t learn. It seems to me we won’t learn not to
trust. I don’t know. It seems to me it would be better to
be harder, trust less.
Anna was still laughing, but I could see the idea that it
might be better for people to trust less bothered her. She
began to talk about “business” in the village, describing the
unethical practices of caviar merchants and the environmental
degradation caused by companies that mine the area for gold
and platinum:
And we’re not hard, at all. Somewhere you can say, “They’re
not right. We need to do something.” But when it comes
down to it, for example, when the person is sitting there.
. . . No. Silent. You’re silent. I don’t know. To put another
person in an uncomfortable position, it’s uncomfortable
somehow. He will begin to ask questions, extract himself
from it, search for loopholes, explain everything. . . . You
even become embarrassed yourself how he stands in front
of you, justifying himself, right? And you sit and listen to
him. . . . Well, that’s how we live. And trust. Poor. But yes,
if we would be firm, if there were people who promised us
everything, the prosperity of the village, and if they would
support their words. . . . We wouldn’t lose that gift, that
trust. But this is all going away.
Anna was not the only one who drew this parallel between
the dilemma posed by the public goods game and the ex-
ploitation of local people by outsiders who did not share their
sense of trust and altruistic obligations. Artur was similarly
dismayed by the trade in salmon caviar that brought mer-
chants (kommersanty) to the town every summer, employing
local people to harvest fish and prepare caviar but either
paying them less than originally promised or paying them in
alcohol instead of money. Artur explained:
“Here we have people that are very trusting. . . . And very
many people who are newcomers [priezzhie] . . . they take
advantage of that. . . . It’s of course very bad, because when
a person has been deceived many times, he begins to drink,
he begins to lose himself. Although on the inside, he doesn’t
change. He just begins to use a lot of alcohol and all the
same, he becomes so victimized.
This kind of behavior was roundly condemned by almost
everyone in the villages, but in the early years of perestroika
it was unfortunately all too common. Still, to a lesser extent,
it persists today. As Anna says, people often find it “uncom-
fortable”—even “embarrassing”—to confront the people who
do these things and hold them responsible. The consequence
is that collectively people begin to lose the “gift” of trust that
they feel is such an essential part of their identity. For Artur,
the tragedy is more personal: a person begins to “lose himself.”
Anna and Artur’s words reminded me of something Irina
told me about the importance of trust to people in the
village:
Here in Khailino, we all know each other. . . . Every person
is plainly visible like an open palm. We know him from his
childhood, how he grew up, how he was born here. So in
a big city, it’s possible they would contribute less. Here it’s
an entirely different matter. We live like a big family here
in Khailino. A common family. Everyone roots for each
other, survives. If someone has misfortunes, you try to sup-
port them, so the person isn’t let loose. That is, reciprocity
here is a very good, necessary thing.
Irina explained how cultural values of trust, altruism, and
reciprocity encourage everyone to be “like an open palm,” to
“root” for one another, and to support people who suffer
from misfortune, so that a person isn’t “let loose.” Deception,
cheating, and exploitation, Artur observed, cause a person to
“lose himself.” This happens because, in Anna’s words, local
people have been “gathered up and thrown away,” given
words that are not “answered for.”
The interviews where people shared these thoughts seemed
to capture both the happiest and saddest moments, the parts
of life in Kamchatka’s rural villages that people are most proud
of, as well as those parts they would often rather forget. They
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attest to the powerful emotions people feel when reflecting
on the transformations that have occurred since the expansion
of the Russian empire, the push to construct the Soviet Union,
and the dramatic post-Soviet collapse that continues to affect
people’s lives today. However, it would be a mistake to read
these statements as simple repudiations of these transfor-
mations. Like many other Russian citizens, people living in
Kamchatka’s rural villages also maintain strong feelings of
nostalgia for the past that guide the present. The difficulty of
disentangling these positive and negative emotions is perhaps
embodied most clearly in collective institutions.
One woman, a retired schoolteacher and pensioner named
Marina, was particularly emphatic that her contribution was
for the sovkhoz: “I said, 200 rubles for the sovkhoz. . . . Why?
Because the sovkhoz, we all dream that it will recover.” Later
I mentioned to Marina that, because the contributions here
were so much higher than elsewhere, some people might not
believe that people in Kamchatka understood the games en-
tirely. She replied:
They should believe. First, because, when you arrive home,
that’s all your country. Here, we have a different mentality.
We live inside this sovkhoz. It used to have so many profits,
everything came from it: gifts, wages for people. Here the
sovkhoz was connected to many things. . . . And now the
sovkhoz has fallen, and people understand. They would like
it to recover, and for that reason, they contributed every-
thing.
Marina’s words echoed ethnographic accounts of the sov-
khoz as a “total social institution,” noting the key role that
the sovkhoz previously played in providing housing, electricity,
employment, products, construction, and a variety of public
goods for the village. But the sovkhoz is currently in a pro-
longed state of crisis, tenuously existing on insufficient gov-
ernment subsidies, aging equipment, limited access to mar-
kets, and a host of other problems associated with perestroika
and the collapse of the Soviet state economy. I asked Marina
if people made these contributions even though the sovkhoz
is now weak and cannot pay salaries to its workers for months
at a time? She said:
Yes. All the same. And those people that were connected to
that organization. It was profitable, strong. There were
20,000 head [of reindeer]. And today, only somewhere
around 3,000? Practically 17,000 lost! . . . It was all lost with
this perestroika. And for that reason I think that our people,
those who were in their 30s or 40s, they understand that
there was a time when they lived well. . . . And for that
reason, in that game forum, you shouldn’t be surprised
about [high contributions].
I asked Danil, a young man in his late 20s, if the word
obshchina was important to him when he decided how much
to contribute. He replied that the word had “many meanings”
but that he defined it as “a community [soobshchestvo] of
people that have a common idea, common interests”:
Obshchina. You pointed it out correctly. I don’t know if you
pointed it out yourself, or if someone helped, but very good.
Obshchina. It’s especially good that you made use of that
word. The obshchina game. It’s immediate, precise. You
won’t find a better word.
Lighting a cigarette, Danil went on to explain the important
role that obshchiny were playing by increasing people’s access
to larger salmon quotas, emphasizing the ways these emerging
collectives formalized existing social relationships within the
community.
While Marina, Danil, and a few others explained their high
contributions by making connections to a collective institu-
tion, statistical analysis of the overall patterns suggests that
average contributions in the two-framed versions of the game
were slightly but significantly lower than the standard version
of the game (table 2). Contributions in the framed versions
are still much higher than the 40%–60% contributions that
are usually observed in public goods games elsewhere, but the
fact that contributions in framed versions are lower than in
the standard version needs to be explained.
One possibility is that the positive sentiments associated
with these collective institutions are offset by a smaller num-
ber of people who harbor negative feelings about the sovkhoz
or the obshchina. Perhaps the standard version of the game
does not tap into these negative feelings to the extent that
the framed versions do, so the contributions in unframed
games are slightly higher. When I asked Artur, who played
in the sovkhoz version, to explain the high contributions in
the village, he offered an alternative to his earlier statements
about the importance of reciprocity:
It’s just that many people worked in the sovkhoz here, and
it’s as if the communist influence still continues to this day.
The main religion of the Soviet Union was work. That is,
you should work as much as you can, but receive kopeks,
meager kopeks. People worked, they contributed it all to
that production: the government, the firm. They toiled so
much. And for that work, they received very little. And they
are already accustomed to sacrifice. That is, give a lot, receive
little. This survives from the past.
However, Artur had earlier explained his own decision to
contribute only 150 rubles to the “sovkhoz fund” as a reflection
of his uncertainty about who would be in his group and his
desire to have “insurance” in case others contributed little.
Indeed, his statements about the sovkhoz were intended to
explain why others had contributed so much, not why he had
contributed so little. Overall, there were very few people who
explicitly expressed negative sentiments about collective in-
stitutions or used these feelings to explain their own or other
people’s contributions. Still, it is possible that hearing the
word sovkhoz or obshchina was enough to diminish some
players’ confidence or trust that others would contribute to
the public good. Hearing the word sovkhoz may have pushed
Artur to seek “insurance” by withholding a small amount of
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money from the group. Perhaps framing the game in this way
evoked the mixed experiences people have had with these
struggling institutions, leading more to adopt a strategy of
conditional cooperation.
Summary
I constructed the narrative above from the conversations I
had with game participants and perspectives from my own
statistical analysis, but I feel it is faithful to the people who
shared their thoughts with me. Whenever possible, I have
made extensive use of quotations so that people’s own ideas
and explanations could stand together with mine. Their words
provide important insights about how people form and main-
tain cooperative relationships in Kamchatka’s rural villages.
They suggest that people saw parallels between the dilemma
posed by the public goods game and a variety of contexts of
cooperation that they encounter in their lives. They also in-
dicate that people drew upon their lived experiences to solve
this dilemma in ways that are not immediately apparent when
examining quantitative data on contributions and expecta-
tions. Their statements suggest that decisions were influenced
by perceptions of confidentiality, attitudes toward risk, no-
tions of property, as well as cultural norms and values of
altruism and reciprocity that emerge from Soviet and post-
Soviet pasts. For empiricists, data from postgame interviews
will not conclusively demonstrate whether methodological
factors or cultural norms and values of interdependence ex-
plain the high contributions in these public goods games.
However, these statements do help identify new lines of in-
quiry for ethnographers to pursue when applying data from
economic games to theories of cooperation. Moreover, many
of the insights that I gained about cooperation in Kamchatka
through these interviews might not have emerged if I had not
combined them with economic games. The game provided a
shared context that grounded the abstract theme of cooper-
ation, allowing us to find a common space of knowledge and
experience from which we could explore and forge connec-
tions between our own unique perspectives.
Discussion
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data from
public goods games highlight ways different cultural norms
and values inform negotiations of cooperative relationships
in Kamchatka today. People in Kamchatka contributed re-
markably large percentages of their endowments to the public
good, explaining these decisions as a result of their expec-
tations that other people would make similar contributions,
their trust in other people, and their generosity toward those
in need. They also interpreted their behavior in the context
of cultural norms of reciprocity, altruism, and a willingness
to contribute individual effort and resources to collective in-
stitutions and common endeavors. The majority of people
actually contributed more than they expected others to give,
and only a few attempted to benefit at the expense of others.
Combined with data from postgame interviews, these results
support the notion underlying my first prediction: contri-
butions in economic games increase along with the impor-
tance of cooperation in people’s everyday lives. If people in
Kamchatka’s rural villages experience higher levels of ecolog-
ical and economic uncertainty—increasing levels of interde-
pendence among them—these conditions may lead to higher
levels of cooperation than those found in other places where
public goods games have been played. This possibility could
be explored further through cross-cultural studies that quan-
tify levels of environmental change, shocks to economic pro-
duction, and interdependence, and then combine these data
with measures of cooperation from economic games.
Although I initially expected the explicit connection be-
tween the structure of the experiment and post-Soviet col-
lectives to increase contributions in the framed games, the
opposite occurred. Despite the positive sentiments inspired
by these connections and expressed in postgame interviews,
statistical analysis shows that average contributions were
slightly lower in framed versions of the game. The regression
models predict that when other factors are held constant,
people in framed games contribute 24–28 rubles less from
their 200 ruble endowment than people in standard games
(table 2). Because most of the people who contributed less
than 200 rubles to the group explained their decisions in
broader terms as “insurance” against “risk”—rather than ex-
plicitly associating the game with negative feelings about col-
lective institutions—the motive underlying lower contribu-
tions in framed games may be more subconscious than
conscious. Moreover, my statistical analysis suggests that this
framing effect may actually follow from a second, subtler
framing effect: the interaction between frame and expecta-
tions.
Framing the game to refer to collective institutions may
have led people to adopt a strategy of conditional cooperation,
contributing as much as they expected others to contribute
to the public good or slightly more. The standard version
presented participants with an abstract social dilemma and
little information to guide them, so they appeared to draw
upon cultural norms and values of altruism and favor strat-
egies of unconditional cooperation. In this context, they ex-
pected that the majority would contribute to the public good
and excused those who did not as worthy beneficiaries of
altruism. In contrast, the framed versions may have inspired
connections to contexts of cooperation in collective institu-
tions past and present, including instances when these insti-
tutions succeeded or failed to reward the efforts of their mem-
bers. Replicating this framing effect in other villages in
Kamchatka or elsewhere in Siberia would increase confidence
in this interpretation. But the evidence presented here suggests
that people’s responses to the cooperative dilemmas posed by
standard versions of the public goods games can be altered
by framing the games in ways that evoke their lived experi-
ences and existing cooperative relationships. Considering the
162 Current Anthropology Volume 54, Number 2, April 2013
tenuous existence of collectives in the post-Soviet era, it may
be tempting for some to see the lower contributions in the
framed versions as an indictment of these institutions. Instead,
I would emphasize the fact that average contributions in ver-
sions of the game framed to refer to the sovkhoz and the
obshchina remain much higher than all places where the public
goods game has been played previously.
In these experiments, putting cooperation in context af-
fected people’s contributions by altering the relationship be-
tween their level of cooperation and the extent to which they
expected others to do the same. This suggests that researchers
using economic games may learn more about the factors in-
fluencing the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior
by devoting greater attention to the relationship between con-
tributions and expectations. Theories of cooperation often
implicitly assume this relationship when positing different
individual strategies; however, few experiments using eco-
nomic games have attempted to document this relationship
and analyze the factors that influence it (Croson 2007; Dawes,
McTavish, and Shaklee 1977; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter 2010;
Henrich and Smith 2004). Without data on both expectations
and contributions, it can be difficult to identify the strategies
adopted by participants in economic games, a necessary step
to test fully theories of cooperation. For example, an indi-
vidual who contributes nothing to the group in a public goods
game may do so simply because he or she does not expect
others to contribute either. While this strategy is not neces-
sarily cooperative, it is not necessarily selfish. Such conditional
cooperators are very different from both a classic free rider—
who does not contribute in order to take advantage of the
expected contributions of others—as well as an indiscriminate
altruist—who cooperates unconditionally, regardless of ex-
pectations about how much others will cooperate. These two
extremes reflect the only strategies that are entirely uninflu-
enced by an individual’s expectations of other players. While
some individuals may pursue these extreme strategies, many
others are likely to fall somewhere in between, either con-
tributing as much as they expect others to contribute or erring
to the side of generosity or the side of selfishness.
When plotted on a simple diagram, the relationship be-
tween expectations and contributions allows researchers to
identify patterns of behavior that constitute this middle
ground in a given place and then to analyze what factors
shape individual strategies (fig. 2d). A few studies have used
this relationship to classify or “type” individual strategies
(Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr 2001; Kurzban and Hauser
2005; Rustagi, Engel, and Kosfeld 2010) and compare the
relative distribution of strategies cross-culturally (Herrmann
and Tho¨ni 2009; Kocher et al. 2008). Together, these studies
suggest that strategies of conditional cooperation predominate
in a variety of contexts but are also accompanied by strategies
biased toward generosity or selfishness in proportions that
vary from one place to the next in ways that are poorly un-
derstood. Ethnographers can make unique contributions to
illuminating this important question.
People’s assessments of the costs and benefits of their ac-
tions, as well as the actions of others, are clearly influenced
by cultural values, norms, and institutions. One way to begin
to identify and understand these influences is by designing
research that explores framing effects, or combines experi-
mental and ethnographic data in other creative ways (Barr
and Genicot 2008; Cardenas 2003; Cronk, Gerkey, and Irons
2009; Lesorogol 2005; Macfarlan and Quinlan 2008; Rucas et
al. 2010; Tucker 2012; Wiessner 2009). A major challenge of
studying the cultural norms and values associated with co-
operative behavior is that researchers may not share the same
understandings of key concepts such as altruism, reciprocity,
deception, and free riding with the people who participate in
their studies. Economic games provide a concrete event, with
shared rules and structure that both researcher and participant
can draw upon when seeking to understand one another. My
understanding of people’s ideas about cooperation in Kam-
chatka was significantly enhanced by the opportunity to refer
back to the game when explaining my thoughts and posing
my questions. The participants in my research made similar
use of the games while trying to help me understand the
important role that cooperation plays in defining their iden-
tities and ensuring that they survive and thrive.
Acknowledgments
I want to thank all the people who participated in these ex-
periments, as well as those who were part of my broader
research project on cooperation and collective action in Kam-
chatka. Without them, none of this work would have been
possible. This research was supported by grants from Ful-
bright IEE, the National Science Foundation Arctic Social
Sciences (0714853) and Polar Program (1019303), and the
Wenner-Gren Foundation. The views expressed here are my
own and do not reflect those of the sponsors. Additional
financial support was provided by the Rutgers University
Graduate School–New Brunswick Department of Anthro-
pology and Center for Human Evolutionary Studies. While
conducting research, I was affiliated with the Kamchatka
Branch of the Pacific Institute of Geography under the su-
pervision of Dr. Viktoria V. Petrasheva. I received valuable
comments on drafts of this article from Lee Cronk, Donna
Leonetti, Eric A. Smith, and six anonymous reviewers from
Current Anthropology. I also received valuable feedback on
earlier versions from Robin Fox, Bonnie McCay, Ryne Pal-
ombit, and colleagues in the Rutgers evolution, psychology,
and culture reading group. Any errors that remain are my
own.
Gerkey Post-Soviet Collectives in Kamchatka, Russia 163
Comments
Abigail Barr
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park,
Nottingham NG7 2DR, U.K. (abigail.barr@nottingham.ac.uk). 28
IX 12
Drew Gerkey invited the inhabitants of two villages in Kam-
chatka to participate in a public goods game (PGG). Seventy
villagers chose to participate. To 23 of these, the PGG was
explained using only abstract terms, while to the other 47 it
was explained with reference to one of two types of locally
functioning cooperatives. Gerkey reports levels of contribu-
tion in the PGG that are very high in comparison to levels
recorded during similar PGGs conducted elsewhere. He also
reports that, contrary to his prediction, contributions were
lower in the framed as compared to the abstract versions of
the game and that participants appeared to condition their
contributions on their expectations of others’ contributions
in the framed but not in the abstract version. Finally, he
presents a series of quotes drawn from postgame interviews
with the villagers. These indicate that the villagers understood
the game, that their characterizations of the PGG concur well
with those of social scientists, and that they saw similarities
between the PGG and aspects of their everyday lives. The
importance of trust in both everyday life and as a support
for cooperation within the game received considerable atten-
tion. However, the quotes also reveal that the villagers viewed
the money given to them to play the PGG as windfalls and,
thus, different from earned money.
I found the paper enjoyable and thought provoking, and
I hope that Gerkey will continue to pursue this line of re-
search. Much of the qualitative work does indeed suggest that
the PGGs may have had some external validity. However,
given the villagers’ perception of the money used in the games
as windfall, potential external validity may be limited. Also,
it is important to remember that external validity is not only
about the way participants perceive experiments. External va-
lidity refers to the extent to which we can draw inferences
about the way people behave in everyday life from the data
generated by the experiment.
The quantitative findings are sufficiently thought provoking
to warrant further investigation but are problematic as a basis
for drawing conclusions. I am particularly reluctant to accept
Gerkey’s conclusion that the high level of PGG contributions
by the Kamchatka villagers is owing to their cooperativeness
in everyday life. This is because there are at least two possible
confounds that have yet to be considered. First, the partici-
pants self-selected into the experiment after being invited by
an outsider with an expressed interest in cooperation and
sharing. The less cooperative may have chosen to stay away.
Second, the participants, as well as suspecting that their de-
cisions would eventually be found out by their fellow villagers,
may have moderated their behavior because they were being
observed by this same outsider.
Second, while I accept that the contributions were signif-
icantly lower and significantly more correlated with the par-
ticipants’ expectations in the framed version, the sample sizes
are very small. The significant coefficient on the expectations
variable under the framed version of the game is driven by
13 people’s decisions, 6 of whom appear to be strict condi-
tional cooperators and 6 of whom appear to condition their
contributions to some extent. My concerns about sample size
are compounded by the self-section mentioned above. This
notwithstanding, I do think that these results are sufficiently
interesting to warrant further investigation.
Figure 2b reveals one other regularity in the data that is
not reflected in the text of the paper. The participants dra-
matically underestimated the cooperativeness of their neigh-
bors. This suggests a degree of distrust, which is not incon-
sistent with the quotes, as the latter tend to refer to the
importance of rather than the level of trust. However, it does
raise questions about what was really going on in the PGG.
Marina may have been onto something when she said “And
now the sovkhoz has fallen, and people understand. They
would like it to recover, and for that reason, they contributed
everything.” I wonder whether the recent changes in the post-
Soviet collective institutions are perceived as failures or de-
clines in cooperation by the villagers. This might explain the
negative framing effect and the mismatch between expected
and actual contributions. Anyone who shares Marina’s sen-
timent could have seen the PGG as an opportunity to signal
dissatisfaction with the decline in cooperativeness and a desire
to play a part in its regeneration. Of course this is all spec-
ulation, but it is not inconsistent with Gerkey’s findings to
date.
Looking ahead, it would be interesting to try and replicate
the results based on a larger and representative sample. To
explore external validity, one could (1) explore correlations
between PGG contributions and village-level changes in the
post-Soviet collective institutions and (2) get participants to
work for the money that they then go on to use in the PGG
to see whether contributions out of earned and windfall
money differ.
Nicolas Baumard
Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program, University of Penn-
sylvania, 313 Cohen Hall, 249 South 36th Street, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania 19104, U.S.A. (nbaumard@gmail.com). 4 X 12
Cultural Norms: Transmitted Behaviors or
Adaptive Responses?
The target article provides a unique perspective on the meth-
odology of economic games and demonstrates, once again,
that economic games are far from ecologically valid. Beyond
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this welcome methodological discussion, it also sheds new
light on the origins of cultural variations and on the workings
of human cooperation. In recent years, many scholars have
assumed that cultural differences necessarily reflect the exis-
tence of culturally selected behaviors that are adaptive at the
group level (Boyd and Richerson 2009; Henrich et al. 2004).
Individuals in industrialized societies would display a higher
level of fairness because fairness is a useful adaptation for
large-scale societies (Henrich et al. 2010). Another possibility,
however, is that cultural differences simply reflect adaptive
responses to different environments (Baumard, Andre´, and
Sperber 2013; Delton et al. 2010). According to this possibility,
individuals would behave differently because they face dif-
ferent constraints that require different responses.
There is thus a debate between cultural group selection
approaches and approaches based on individual’s evolved psy-
chology, and the two main conclusions of the target article
are more in line with the latter than the former. First, the
high level of cooperation observed in Kamchatka seems to be
accounted for by the adaptive response to ecological param-
eters such as perception of confidentiality, attitude toward
risk, importance of money in the environment, and expec-
tations regarding others’ contributions. Indeed, all these pa-
rameters are compatible with (and actually follow directly
from) the idea that cooperation has evolved by partner choice
and requires people to carefully choose their partners, mon-
itor their reputation, assess others’ reputations, balance the
benefits of cooperation with the risk of being exploited, and
so forth (Andre´ and Baumard 2011; Bateson, Nettle, and
Roberts 2006; Haley and Fessler 2005; Kurzban et al. 2001).
Second, the adverse effect of framing observed on partic-
ipants’ contributions appears at odds with cultural group se-
lection. Indeed, if anything, explicit framing referring to co-
operative institutions such as sovkhoz and obshchina should
reinforce cooperation. Of course, it is possible to accom-
modate this fact with group selection by making the hypoth-
esis that some participants may associate sovkhoz and obsh-
china with bad levels of cooperation. However, interviews
suggest otherwise: people seem nostalgic from the Soviet Un-
ion and associate sovkhoz with high levels of cooperation.
By contrast, the lower level of cooperation observed in
framing conditions may fit with the adapted response hy-
pothesis. Indeed, according to this theory, there is an im-
portant difference between small-scale cooperative behaviors
that are spontaneously produced by our evolved psychology
and large-scale cooperative behaviors that rely not only on
human evolved psychology but also on institutions, punish-
ments, and rewards (Baumard, Boyer, and Sperber 2010; Os-
trom 1990). Thus, while sharing food, letting one’s hunting
cabin opened, or taking care of a drunkard belongs to small-
scale cooperation, cooperation within sovkhoz and obshchina
are clearly sustained by incentives (goods, salaries) and pun-
ishments (fines, exclusion). In other words, small-scale co-
operation is sustained by intrinsic motivation (morality) while
large-scale cooperation is sustained by extrinsic motivation
(reward and punishment).
The existence of reward and punishment in a particular
setting is crucial to understand people’s psychology. Indeed,
recent studies show that rewards and punishments tend to
crowd out people’s intrinsic motivation (for reviews, see
Bowles 2008; Frey and Jegen 2001). Since cooperation is en-
forced by punishment or reward, people feel that contributing
to the common good is not a matter of duty but rather a
matter of personal preference. In a classic study in an Israeli
day-care facility, for instance, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
showed that the implementation of a fine on parents who
pick up their child late actually decreased parents’ moral mo-
tivation to arrive on time and reinforced the idea that there
was no moral duty to arrive on time. Similarly, in a public
good game modeling the tragedy of the commons, Cardenas,
Stranlund, and Willis (2000) found that regulating partici-
pants’ behavior by fining the cheaters actually reduced ev-
eryone’s willingness to spontaneously cooperate with others.
Falkinger et al. (2000) found that participants who experience
an incentive system that is eventually removed tend to co-
operate less than participants who were never exposed such
an incitation system.
In light of the literature, it might be the case that partic-
ipants in Kamchatka cooperate less in the framing conditions
because sovkhoz and obshchina are situations in which one
only cooperates to the extent that it is individually profitable
and extrinsically rewarded. If this is true, it would confirm
the idea that the kind of small-scale cooperative behaviors
observed in economic games is influenced by ecological pa-
rameters rather than by transmitted norms.
Juan Camilo Cardenas Campo
Facultad de Economia, Bloque W, Calle 19A No. 1-7 Este, Bogota,
Colombia (jccarden@uniandes.edu.co). 19 IX 12
Gerkey wants to “understand how people in Kamchatka
thought about cooperative relationships,” and for this he com-
bined ethnographic, experimental, and statistical tools. The
depth of the material presented in the article, coming from his
fascinating doctoral dissertation, allowed him to discuss the
still-open question about the parallels between economic ex-
periments and the reality of the people participating in them.
The value therefore is in both the understanding of social
dilemmas in rural societies in the post-Soviet era and in using
multiple methods to study reality in general. Readers of one
of the latest works by the late Elinor Ostrom, Working Together
(Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010) would find in this effort
by Gerkey a perfect example of their invitation to combine
methods to better understand the problem of collective action.
I will focus my commentary, however, on the experimental
component of the project.
A central question is on how the framing of a public goods
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(PG) experiment might influence participants’ choices. Al-
though framing effects have been studied in the behavioral
and experimental sciences for decades, it remains interesting.
In this case, the framing is central to the very nature of the
context in which people in Kamchatka live. Gerkey chose to
test an unframed design of a PG game against two types of
institutions that have governed production and are familiar
to his participants, the sovkhoz (state farm), and the obshchina
(community). The first interesting result is that the cooper-
ation rates are quite high, regardless of the treatment, although
comparisons need to be made with caution. In particular, we
should be aware that the ratio of the returns from cooperation
and the returns from free riding here are rather high, since
groups were of only four people who knew themselves quite
well, and contributions to the public fund were doubled and
distributed equally (marginal per capita return p 0.5). Even
more interesting, although not discussed in much detail, is
the fact that expectations were lower, on average, than actual
contributions.
Although I recognize from firsthand experience the effort
required to conduct a field operation like this one, one should
be alert that the small sample of 70 participants limits the
statistical possibilities. By sampling people in two villages,
Khalino and Vyvenka, and only the former with reindeer
herding economic activity, and by testing the three framings,
such a small sample would limit the possibility of explaining
the variability of the individual data on the common-resource
problem (reindeer or salmon), the location, or the institution.
The regression analysis does provide some clues, but these
results still invite more discussion.
The article does highlight the puzzle of why it was the
unframed game that showed greater cooperation levels than
the state farm, and in the lower level the community one
suggested one should expect the opposite. One possible ex-
planation is the actual decay of the Soviet-era institutions that
led to a belief that community-based production would fall
into the trap of free riding, and with the experiment framings
of the sovkhoz or the obshchina, they were cued from exper-
imenters coming from Western societies with market and pri-
vate property rights. Here all three framings have the exact
same material incentives, and with a between-subjects design
different groups faced different framings. Therefore, any sig-
nificant difference could be explained in part by the framing,
which affects other nonmaterial incentives. This reminded me
of an experimental study conducted by Ockenfels and Wei-
mann (1999) at the right historic moment in the recently
reunified Germany. They sampled a set of students who grew
up in each side of the Berlin wall. Those from the east Berlin
area were less cooperative and had less solidarity than their
counterparts in the West. The authors, in fact, revisited their
study 20 years later and continued to find the same gap (Bro-
sig et al. 2011). Their design allowed them to have a better
counterfactual, the west Germany students, whereas in the
Kamchatka case there is not necessarily one. Maybe the de-
tailed ethnographic work conducted by Gerkey and a com-
parison of the interviews with people across the different treat-
ments or framings could show some clues on how the
institutions of production in the Soviet era shaped preferences
for these people. The study of social norms in communities
depending on natural resources and the interactions between
endogenous community dynamics and state-based institu-
tions continue to puzzle experimental research (Cardenas
2011).
One more question remains for discussion. Does this fram-
ing effect help solve the question of external validity or not?
It is hard to tell but worth discussing. The slim difference
between the state farm and the community framing opens
more questions than answers. These are very different types
of institutions, the former being more top-down and the latter
bottom-up in terms of how the rules and management were
built and implemented, and yet the experimental behavior
was quite similar, in both cases showing high levels of co-
operation.
Endeavors like Gerkey’s should continue in the social and
behavioral sciences. Anthropologists with their tools have
contributed enormously and have joined other disciplines in
looking for answers to the puzzle of social dilemmas.
Christophe Heintz
Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University,
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What Can’t Be Inferred from Cross-Cultural
Experimental Games
People will use, in order to make sense of experimental games,
their past history of interactions and their cultural knowledge
of similar social situations (Heintz and Bardsley 2010). Eth-
nographers running experimental games have reported that
subjects draw analogies with their day-to-day lives in order
to make better sense of the experimental games. They use
these analogies for understanding what kind of behavior is
expected and to predict their partners’ decisions. Drawing on
cultural information is, from the subjects’ point of view, nec-
essary because the information needed to determine what is
the right, fair, or estimable choice is not fully provided by
the game, and it is only partially inferred by our intuitions
of fairness (Baumard, Andre´, and Sperber 2013). What is the
right amount of money to transfer so as be fair, praiseworthy,
or estimable? The rather “weird” experiments need to be in-
terpreted (Baumard and Sperber 2010), and people do that
by drawing on their social experience. The consequence is
that people from different cultures will interpret the experi-
mental game they play differently; they will form different
beliefs about what their partners will play and expect. Let us
call the consequent variation in the decisions taken the “cul-
tural framing effects.” There is a framing effect when one
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obtains statistically different results from psychological ex-
periments that differ only in the way the instructions are
presented to the subjects or in the setting of the experiment
but not in the cost-benefit structures. Framing effects signal
that the decision-making process is sensitive to frame. Thus,
the very same person would make different decisions if pre-
sented with one frame or another. Let us call “cultural frame”
the set of information or cues that are found outside of the
experiment but upon which subjects draw inferences for tak-
ing their decisions in the experiment. In analogy with framing
effects, cultural framing effect denotes the variations that are
caused by changing the cultural frame but keeping constant
the subjects’ psychological makeup (including their social
preferences) and the monetary stakes. The cross-cultural var-
iation obtained in experimental games can result either from
cultural framing effects or from cultural differences in the
personality of the subjects.
There are very good reasons to think that there are cultural
framing effects: Gerkey’s experiments or Cronk’s (2007) pro-
vide evidence that all humans, across cultures, are sensitive
to frames, and the first paragraph of this commentary presents
good reasons to think that this sensitivity extends to cultural
frames. But if cross-cultural variation of experimental games’
results can be accounted for in terms of cultural framing
effects, then they do not provide evidence that there are cul-
tural variations in the personality of the subjects with regard
to prosociality. The null hypothesis that people have similar
propensities to trust, be generous, and cooperate across cul-
tures is not proven false. In particular, Gerkey’s results do not
demonstrate that people from Kamchatka are intrinsically
more generous than others. When asked why they have been
generous, subjects of Gerkey’s experiments answered that it
is just the way they are. The post hoc aspect of the interviews
together with the fundamental attribution error makes their
answer unsurprising. It should not lead social scientists to
make the same error and ascribe their behavior to personality
traits rather than to the external conditions causing cultural
framing effects.
With this in mind, what is the value of the external validity
that Gerkey has assessed? Gerkey shows that he obtained ex-
ternally valid data: there is a similarity between behavior in
the experiments and behavior in some standard social context
of Kamchatka. This, however, is of interest only if it forms a
basis for externally valid theories—theories that, explaining
behavior in the lab, are sufficiently powerful to also explain
behavior in the field. Gerkey’s paper shows that ethnographic
data can help explaining laboratory data but not the reverse.
Ethnography can help explaining decisions in the lab because
subjects of experiments use their cultural knowledge for in-
ferring information that they deem relevant for playing ex-
perimental games. The reverse, data on behavior in labs help-
ing to explain variations of cooperative behavior across
cultures, would be obtained if game experiments would reveal
that people from Kamchtaka (or some other culture) are more
inclined to cooperate. This inclination could then by hy-
pothesized to results from internalized cultural norms and be
the cause of more cooperation in day-to-day life. But this line
of reasoning is flawed: Kamchatka’s higher contribution can
be due to cultural framing effects rather than stronger pro-
pensities to be generous that carry over across conditions—
from the lab to all sorts of conditions in natural settings.
Another line of reasoning might provide explanatory value
to cross-cultural variation of behaviors in experimental games.
If this variation is understood as cultural framing effects, then
one can hypothesize that cultures with high contributions in
experimental games include more or stronger prosocial
norms, which frame the experiment. Cultural framing effects
thus provide information about norms of cooperation in di-
verse cultures. However, even this modest information should
not be overestimated: First, the framing norms can be related
to specific types of interactions (such as “pay your tram
ticket”) rather than general norms of interactions (such as
“be generous”). They might indicate the type of interactions
there are, but not, if there is such a thing, a general level of
cooperation. In particular, higher contributions in experi-
mental games might result from cultural frames made of
norms regulating exchange with anonymous individuals, as
is common in Western industrialized societies. Second, the
existence of norms says little about why people come to abide
by the norms. In particular, the framing norms need not be
internalized values; it is sufficient that they are known for
them to have framing effects. This is what Cronk and Was-
ielewski’s experiment demonstrates: US Americans, after only
reading about an unfamiliar norm regulating giving—the
Osotua of the Masai—are subject to framing effects (Cronk
and Wasielewski 2008). The Osotua norm was not internal-
ized, and it most probably did not change the social behavior
of the subjects once out of the lab, yet it nonetheless acted
as a factor of decision in the experimental game. This suggests
that cross-cultural variations in experimental games result
more from efforts to coordinate on mutually satisfactory out-
comes, which depend on what others will do and what they
will expect from their partners, than from variations in pro-
social dispositions.
Benjamin Grant Purzycki and Richard Sosis
Centre for Human Evolution, Cognition, and Culture, 1871 West
Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z2, Canada (bgpurzycki
@alumni.ubc.ca)/Department of Anthropology, University of Con-
necticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06269-2176, U.S.A. (richard.sosis
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The target article is a welcome case study of the cooperative
behavior of a population from the Russian Far East. The key
results are (a) Kamchatkans gave significantly more in the
public goods game than typically found elsewhere in the world
and (b) how the game was framed significantly affected per-
formance in the game. Of the former result, Gerkey states
that the fishing and reindeer herding modes of subsistence
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“compel individuals to work together to harvest from com-
mon-pool resources.” Of the latter result, it may be the case
that Kamchatkans have negative associations with collectiv-
ized institutions. While Gerkey makes a compelling case, there
are a number of questions that need to be addressed. One
immediate difficulty of the interpretation that Kamchatkans
are more cooperative than others is that we have little in the
way of a direct comparative analysis. Of course, such a com-
parison is impossible until a larger, cross-cultural database is
developed, and hopefully Gerkey’s results will help stimulate
its development. However, until one exists, Gerkey’s argu-
ments would be more compelling if he were able to dem-
onstrate that Kamchatkans value and/or require cooperation
more than others. Follow-up studies would be served well by
accounting for variation in individuals’ evaluation of collec-
tive endeavors. It remains unclear why the Soviet-inspired
frames elicited, on average, significantly lower contributions.
Importantly, one-shot and the initial round in public goods
games often elicit high contributions, and in some cases the
proportion of the contribution can be quite high depending
on the design. For example, Cadsby and Maynes detail that
in the first round of a threshold public goods game, partic-
ipants contributed just over 80% of their total initial endow-
ment (1998:617). In another case, using American under-
graduate students, Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) report
that male contributions in initial rounds in all or nothing
trials of low value (US$1.00) consistently contributed 93.8%
across various treatments, with subsequently decreasing con-
tributions. Interestingly, the other Russian groups detailed in
table 1 in the target article contribute far less on average than
in the present study. As such, case studies with similar con-
ditions are necessary to gauge confidence in the results.
Could it be the case that Kamchatkans were concerned
about what the experiment said about them as individuals?
This seems apparent in some of the ethnographic quotes Ger-
key offers. Therefore, it may be that increased trust borne out
by the economy there is not driving the results as much as
the economy is driving attempts to appear willing to engage
in such risks. For instance, Alexandr’s sentiments that “risk
. . . is a noble act” suggests this might be the case insofar as
engaging in costly risks is a reliable indicator of commitment
to the group when framed in the context of a group. What
motivates people in such contexts may be this motivation to
be reliably perceived of as committed rather than merely the
fear of repercussions, as indicated by Anna’s concern of oth-
ers’ perceptions. Could such passages express a disregard for
the anonymous character of the design?
Given the research setting, it was probably very difficult to
get a random sample. The methods of recruitment may have
had something to do with the difference in participation be-
tween the sexes. If participants arrived together and these
participants effectively recruited each other by word of mouth,
then the perceived probability that one plays with one’s close
friend or relative may be increased even though the assign-
ment was randomized. Anna, for example, speculates that the
higher contributions may have something to do with the lack
of anonymity between individuals in the community. If Anna
elicited such an interpretation, it may have been the case that
she was readily aware of the fact that close relations partici-
pated in the study.
Considering that the sovkhoz and obshchina treatments’
modal contributions were 100% (indicative of a ceiling effect),
what needs to be explained is the handful of individuals who
gave less in these conditions, as Gerkey rightly suggests. There
might be a few ways to do this with the current data set. Were
age and sex evenly distributed across treatments? While sex
appears to show no overall effects in the present study, there
are strong indications that females coordinate better in such
games (see Brown-Kruse and Hummels 1993; Cadsby and
Maynes 1998; Cox and Deck 2006; Nowell and Tinkler 1994).
In future studies, a scale designed to account for variation of
the reception of Soviet institutions would be important to
include. Nevertheless, the study demonstrates that such fram-
ing effects are important and deserve careful consideration in
future designs.7
Bram Tucker
Department of Anthropology, University of Georgia, 250A Baldwin
Hall, Athens, Georgia 30602-1619, U.S.A. (bramtuck@uga.edu). 5
IX 12
I applaud the author for this delightful, creative, and rich
contribution to the literature on sociality and economic
games. In this brief note I contemplate what the qualitative,
ethnographic data have to say about the quantitative results
of the game. I argue that Gerkey’s major success is a rich
ethnographic understanding of people’s lived, social experi-
ences. But what is less clear is whether the ethnographic data
“validates” the experimental methodology. By validation I do
not mean to question the whole enterprise of experiments. I
mean validation as it is used in survey research; do we un-
derstand what the results of the experiments tell us? Some
previous attention has been paid to the external validity of
games, that is, whether they predict actual behavior (Gurven
and Winking 2008; Smith 2005; Wiessner 2009). Here I con-
template internal validity. Do experimental games measure
the same thing (presumably prosocial norms) in the same
way across societies? Or do different societies, or different
members within the society, understand and play such games
in qualitatively different ways? Finally, I ask whether prosocial
norms are cognitively accessible, whether we should expect
our informants to be capable of reporting accurately why they
made generous offers in an experiment, or does the researcher
7. During the preparation of this comment, Purzycki was supported
by the SSHRC-funded Cultural Evolution of Religion Research Consor-
tium (CERC) at the University of British Columbia, and Sosis was sup-
ported by an ESRC large grant (REF RES-060-25-0085) and CTI at
Princeton University.
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hazard recording popular idealized narratives of behaviors
that ought to exist?
Gerkey found that people in Kamchatka made exceptionally
high offers in the public goods game compared to studies
from elsewhere in the world, and players explained their own
play by describing strong norms of generosity that patterned
their expectations that other players would be generous. On
the face of it this would seem to suggest that game play is a
faithful match to prosocial norms and behavior.
Statements like Anna’s, who insisted that the game was
parallel to real life social situations, suggest that the experi-
ment has high “face validity,” meaning that the exercise has
the same meaning for the research participants as for the
researcher. But not everyone saw the game as Anna did. A
few card sharks saw the exercise as akin to other recreational
games in which the point is to win (Nadia). Other low offers
were explained as resulting from personal need for cash, or
from low expectations that others will contribute. As Gerkey
points out, while all low offers are analytically consistent with
a free-riding strategy, none of these explanations is consistent
with free riding in intent. So we have multiple reasons why
people make low or high offers: generalized prosocial norms
(Anna), individual risk-seeking strategy to win the game (Na-
dia), risk-averse strategies to protect oneself when expecta-
tions of others’ generosity are low, and personal need.
Thus, it is not clear that the PGG and other games measures
a single underlying “thing” so as to permit direct cross-cul-
tural quantitative comparison. While some of the cross-cul-
tural differences in an ultimatum game offers and rejection
rates are probably due to different prosocial norms (Ga¨chter
and Hermann 2009; Henrich et al. 2005), some of this var-
iation could be due to cultural and individual differences in
face validity. Some participants see the exercise as an abstract
game they should try to win, others as a generalized social
simulation, others as a chance to gain some much needed
cash, and others as a simulation of a familiar cultural insti-
tution.
Should we expect players to be able to explain their choices?
Many scholars of judgment and decision making are skeptical
about “self-report data” (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001;
Chandon, Morwitz, and Reinartz 2005; Nisbett and Ross
1980:202–210; Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Ask someone why
she drove versus taking the train, or voted Democrat versus
Republican, and your informant is likely to present a rea-
sonable argument, but this argument does not necessarily
correspond to actual behavior. One often repeats popular,
public narratives (gas is too expensive, or I don’t want higher
taxes). The Mikea hunter-gatherer-farmers of southwestern
Madagascar that I study are very proud of how generous they
are, yet in practice, Mikea men and women often go out of
their way to avoid obligations to share food (Tucker 2004).
So too much face validity, or too transparent an exercise, may
result in people playing to type to demonstrate their allegiance
to popular ideals, rather than behaving as they might in real
life.
Gerkey quite successfully uses the games to generate fas-
cinating discussion among his informants about sociality and
cooperation. His use of games resembles the strategy em-
ployed in participatory methods. For example, in participa-
tory mapping, the primary data is the discussion generated
from the mapping exercise, rather than the map itself (Cham-
bers 1994).
I applaud Gerkey for combining experimental and eth-
nographic methods. While the uneven fit between the two
forms of data leads to questions of validity, asking such ques-
tions is itself a significant step forward. Answering such ques-
tions will likely entail further cross-referencing results from
experiments, ethnography, and behavioral observation.
Amber Wutich
School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State
University, P.O. Box 872402, Tempe, Arizona 85287-2402, U.S.A.
(amber.wutich@asu.edu). 18 IX 12
It is an exciting time to be an anthropologist. Many of our
colleagues in economics, psychology, political science, and
other fields now share (or are at least willing to entertain)
our view of economic behaviors as deeply embedded in social
systems and cultural meanings. Together, we are working to
develop an understanding of the ways in which various social
factors—such as cultural norms, social learning, and com-
munication—shape economic decision making.
Experimental economics provides an important set of tools
that facilitate rigorous, cross-cultural explorations of these
questions. Gerkey’s study follows anthropologists, such as Lee
Cronk, Carolyn Lesorogol, and Jean Ensminger, who pio-
neered the “cultural framing” approach to economic exper-
iments. One advantage of this approach is that it helps us
demonstrate how cultural institutions (i.e., rules and norms)
cause people’s behavior to deviate from the predictions of
neoclassical economics. Gerkey’s results are certainly a striking
example of this: he finds that people in Kamchatka, Russia,
have the highest average level of contributions ever docu-
mented in a public goods game. Gerkey’s findings—and the
fact that the second-highest level of public goods game con-
tributions was found in Vietnam—seem to suggest that the
legacy of communist institutions may be somehow shaping
these cooperative economic behaviors. Gerkey anticipates this,
designed his experiments to test it, and comes up with some
rather unexpected results.
The fascinating puzzle posed by Gerkey’s work is not just
that people in Kamchatka played the game so much more
cooperatively than anywhere else in the world but that they
were actually less cooperative when the games were framed
as local collective institutions, the sovkhoz and obshchina. To
explore this, Gerkey pairs his experiments with in-depth eth-
nographic and narrative analysis designed to uncover why the
sovkhoz and obshchina might inspire less cooperation than the
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unframed public goods game. Based on this analysis, he argues
that the unique ecological and political-economic character-
istics of life in Kamchatka—including extreme climate, sub-
sistence livelihoods, and social isolation—compel people to
form cooperative relationships in order to survive. Further,
he suggests that Kamchatka residents’ past disappointments
with failed collective institutions made them less likely to
behave cooperatively when presented with the cultural frames.
Gerkey’s paper thus brings together two often separate
streams of anthropological thinking—one interested in ex-
amining macro-level political and economic transformations
and another focused on predicting economic behavior at an
individual level—in novel ways. In the Kamchatka case, Ger-
key argues, collective institutions are well-suited to improve
survival outcomes, but locals’ historic inability to protect such
institutions from outside manipulation and exploitation un-
dermines their willingness to invest in them. This is, in some
ways, the flip side of the arguments made so persuasively by
Elinor Ostrom, Steve Lansing, Paul Trawick, and others: that
self-governed societies can develop collective institutions to
sustainably manage scarce resources. Gerkey’s work demon-
strates that, even when communities possess the knowledge,
skill, and commitment to design and maintain such institu-
tions, they cannot do so if their attempts at self-governance
are constantly undermined by the political and economic
powers shaping the broader society.
Gerkey’s work thus hints at some new answers to a question
of general and long-standing interest: under what conditions
do cultural institutions actually improve humans’ ability to
manage resources? Gerkey’s findings demonstrate how the
political-economic conditions driving privatization in post-
Soviet Russia play against local socioecological factors that
encourage cooperation in Kamchatka. As we engage in larger
conversations—beyond the confines of anthropology—about
the social and cultural factors that shape economic behavior,
Gerkey’s work provides a model for navigating the complex-
ities of a holistic approach to understanding human culture.
In a recent paper (Anderies et al. 2011), my colleagues and
I discussed methodological approaches to studying social con-
text in lab and field experiments; as we argue, this is a domain
of research with great potential for making innovative and
novel contributions. We have a long way to go before we can
fully answer the challenges of rational choice theorists and
others who question anthropological understandings of eco-
nomic behavior, but more of this kind of work—scholarship
that harnesses the strengths of our different approaches to
understanding economic behavior—will move us closer.
John P. Ziker
Department of Anthropology, Boise State University, 1910 Univer-
sity Drive, Boise, Idaho 83702, U.S.A. (jziker@boisestate.edu). 17
IX 12
What better place to study cooperation than Siberia? Prince
Petr Kropotkin (1842–1921), author of Mutual Aid: A Factor
in Evolution (1904 [1902]), argued that cooperation was the
creative factor in evolution. Gerkey’s contribution carries on
this tradition in some respects with new arguments and new
data about the development of cooperative institutions. In
particular, the idea that framing effects are more than simply
cultural epiphenomena but are the result of real social inter-
dependence among community members, arguing for the ex-
ternal validity of experimental technique, has broad impli-
cations for the inclusion of such experiments in the
ethnographer’s tool kit. I know from my own use of economic
games in northern Siberia as part of the study by Henrich et
al. (2006, 2010), community members greatly enjoyed par-
ticipating in economic games because no one walks away a
loser.
“Cooperation in Context” argues that the history of com-
munity economic institutions in the Kamchatka region from
early Soviet through to the modern-day periods influences
game behavior. The manipulation of one variable in the script
of the game (generic vs. obshchina vs. state farm) “framed”
the purpose of a group fund in which respondents were os-
tensibly investing. With this experimental manipulation Ger-
key discovered that indigenous Kamchatkan’s view of the So-
viet period as a “golden age” is more than simple perception.
While the process of organization of indigenous Siberians,
first with voluntary associations, then collectives and state
farms, is unitary across Siberia, what is not well understood
is the diversity of present-day outcomes in the post-Soviet
period. The application of game theory–based experiments
helps contextualize why post-Soviet collective institutions,
namely the obshchina, are not as successful as their state-
owned predecessors or the success of a small business in the
West: the level of trust in these intuitions is lower than that
of the now defunct State farms (sovkhoz).
In addition to the game theory–based experiments, Gerkey
gathered significant information on food-sharing connections
in order to assess the external validity of the economic games,
comparing the experimental measures of cooperation with
data on food sharing. The issue of external validity is im-
portant to the application of game theory–based experiments,
because the experiments are comparatively “content-free,”
which makes them useful across social and cultural contexts.
“Cooperation in Context” provides a unique study of the
emergence and stability of cooperation and collective action
among indigenous salmon fishers and reindeer herders in
Kamchatka, Russia. Gerkey’s article strikes a nice balance be-
tween empirical data and the ethnographic work that helps
to explain the data, something ethnographers of northeastern
Asia and postsocialism will recognize. These research topics
are of general theoretical interest to anthropologists in human
behavioral ecology and economic anthropology, as well as to
institutional economists, and this research helps put anthro-
pology on the radar screen of scholars in related fields.
The article does a great job of analysis of the game results,
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particularly describing individual strategies in terms of their
contributions and expectations of others in the games. The
article does not delve into the individual demographic and
behavioral variables that may explain some of the variation
in the game behavior. Including analysis of individual-level
variables would have linked this research with other cross-
cultural economic experiments looking into factors of within-
and between-group variation. Cultural framing has obvious
effects, but underlying those effects are factors that likely
cross-cut cultural scenarios. For example, Ziker (forthcom-
ing) found that individual variables, such as household size,
material wealth, monetary income, and attendance at religious
services, and game variables, such as the number of examples
needed by participants until they understood the game, had
effects on player 1 offers and player 2 minimal acceptable
offers in the dictator game and ultimatum game, respectively.
Some of these variables were also found to influence game
results in the other studies in the Henrich et al. (2006, 2010)
studies. In addition, PGGs conducted in Boise, Idaho, with
two random samples of adults (Wampler et al. 2011) showed
that behaviors, such as number of volunteer organizations in
which participants reported being involved, frequency of con-
tact with local officials, and electioneering, as well as self-
reported scores on a trust scale, positively affected contri-
butions in a public goods game. “Cooperation in Context”
would provide stronger support if analysis of individual de-
mographic and quantified behavioral variables were presented
alongside the interview materials.
Reply
Although research utilizing economic game experiments has
grown rapidly among social scientists, this method has not
often figured prominently in the ethnographer’s tool kit, and
many are skeptical about the value of experiments for gen-
erating the nuanced, holistic perspectives on human life we
seek (Chibnik 2011). My primary goal in this article was to
build on nascent research by a small group of anthropologists
and economists whose innovation combines the strengths of
experimental and ethnographic approaches. I hoped to ad-
dress a fundamental challenge raised by their work: what
methods can we use to connect data from experimental and
naturally occurring contexts, and how can these connections
contribute to theories of cooperation? I thank all the authors
for their perceptive and engaging commentaries. Each draws
on a wealth of experience integrating experiments and eth-
nography to share important insights on this fundamental
challenge, and their research has inspired my own. My reply
addresses some of their points with the goal of sustaining
dialogues that stimulate future research on cooperation within
anthropology, as well as across disciplines in the social sci-
ences.
Validity
Many of the commentators raised important questions about
the validity of economic games for understanding cooperation
in naturally occurring contexts (Barr, Baumard, Heintz, Pur-
zycki and Sosis, Tucker). If we want to use data from economic
games to develop and test theories of cooperation, we need
to understand the external validity of these experiments. As
I noted, one way to assess external validity is to combine data
from economic games with data on cooperation from contexts
like food sharing, contributions to community projects, or
commitments to institutions. This approach is crucial to in-
tegrating experimental and ethnographic approaches, but it
has produced mixed results. Some studies find significant as-
sociations between contexts, others do not, and it remains
unclear why.
One explanation is that our attempt to control the context
for decision making in experiments creates an environment
that is too abstract to elicit actions that consistently corre-
spond to observations in naturally occurring contexts. This
disconnect is captured by the concept of ecological validity,
noted by Baumard and Heintz: the extent that the range of
decisions, the cost-benefit structure of outcomes, and infor-
mation available in experimental contexts reflects those found
in naturally occurring contexts. By necessity and virtue, all
experiments are abstractions, so there will always be discon-
nects that raise questions about ecological validity. Yet, ex-
periments can still achieve sufficient levels of external validity
without achieving high levels of ecological validity, as long as
their design accurately captures fundamental dynamics of a
social dilemma that connect reliably across contexts (Agar
2004a; Levitt and List 2007). We have a strong incentive to
strike a balance between external and ecological validity be-
cause conducting comparative research often involves a trade-
off between the two. Experiments with high ecological validity
in one place may have high external validity in that place,
but low ecological and external validity in another place, mak-
ing comparative research more difficult. With that trade-off
in mind, the primary value of investigating ecological validity
is to understand what aspects of a naturally occurring social
dilemma to include in the experiment in order to generate
data with sufficient external validity to improve our under-
standing of factors influencing cooperation from one place
to the next. Comparing measures of cooperation from mul-
tiple contexts may be a necessary but insufficient step in lo-
cating the proper balance between ecological and external
validity.
I thank Baumard and Heintz for raising the issue of eco-
logical validity. Their concerns help me clarify my approach
to assessing external validity in this article. Building on in-
sights from research by Ensminger, Tracer, Cronk, Lesorogol,
and others, I combined standard public goods games with
games “framed” to refer to post-Soviet collectives. Framing
the games altered the ecological validity of the experiments
in a controlled way. The standard and framed games posed
identical social dilemmas from a structural perspective. How-
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ever, the framed games invited people to connect the exper-
imental context to post-Soviet collectives, rather than an ab-
stract social dilemma that may or may not connect to
naturally occurring contexts of cooperation in Kamchatka.
Significant differences between standard and framed games
could provide clues about factors that affect the external va-
lidity of the public goods games in Kamchatka. These factors
could be sufficiently general to guide further research beyond
Kamchatka. While approaches combining measures of co-
operation in experimental and naturally occurring contexts
remain important for assessing external validity, approaches
investigating framing effects help us identify what specific
dimensions of social dilemmas need to be incorporated into
experiments in order to maintain external validity and gen-
erate data useful for testing theories of cooperation. The two
approaches are complementary.
Framing Effects
Many commentators focused on assessing the methodological
rigor and theoretical significance of high contributions in
Kamchatka relative to studies in other places. However, the
strength of this project’s design lies in the ability to compare
standard and framed public goods games in Kamchatka,
where issues of internal validity like self-selection (Barr, Pur-
zycki and Sosis) are unlikely to apply because people were
randomly assigned to either a standard or framed version.
My article describes two framing effects relevant for under-
standing the external validity of public goods games in Kam-
chatka. First, average contributions in framed games were
slightly but significantly lower than in standard games. Sec-
ond, the relationship between an individual’s contribution
and expectations differs between standard and framed games.
In framed games, a significant number of people chose strat-
egies of conditional cooperation—contributing as much or
slightly more than they expected others to give—though many
people still chose generous strategies. I suggest this second
framing effect may actually explain the first. Contributions
in framed games are lower because a significant number of
people responded to the contextual cues linking the social
dilemma of the experiment to social dilemmas in post-Soviet
collectives, adopted a conditional strategy relevant to that
context, and contributed accordingly to the public good in
the experiment. Responding to ideas raised by the commen-
tators, I explore the implications of these results for theories
of cooperation, the methods we use to test them, and the
ethnography of post-Soviet collectives in Kamchatka.
Theories of Cooperation
The high contributions in Kamchatka stand out among pre-
vious studies, both within Russia and throughout the world.
Because the factors underlying cross-cultural variation in eco-
nomic games remain a topic of debate—and one case study
is unlikely to resolve the matter—I am hesitant to offer strong
generalizations about the significance of this result for theories
of cooperation. Baumard directs discussion in this direction,
suggesting data from my experiments and postgame inter-
views more closely match predictions from evolutionary the-
ories of cooperation emphasizing individual-level benefits
(indirect reciprocity, partner choice). He also suggests the data
from framed games contradict predictions from theories em-
phasizing group-level benefits (group selection, cultural group
selection). Considering my ethnographic research on coop-
eration and collective action in Kamchatka, I am inclined to
agree with Baumard’s first conclusion but hesitant to accept
his second without a caveat. I have documented the impor-
tance people place on cooperation in their daily lives, the high
level of trust they have for others in the community, and their
willingness to help those in need through participant obser-
vation as well as quantitative surveys of household production
and food-sharing (Gerkey 2010). Both methods suggest fac-
tors like kinship, reciprocity, and reputation shape patterns
of cooperation in naturally occurring contexts, consistent with
theories emphasizing individual-level benefits. Although the
structure of the experiments is intended to negate these fac-
tors, both my postgame interviews and recent research by
others (Baumard, Andre´, and Sperber 2013; Guala 2012, Ha-
gen and Hammerstein 2006) suggest we need to be cautious
in assuming these factors do not influence decisions, even in
one-shot games intended to be anonymous or confidential.
Baumard suggests lower contributions in framed games
contradict predictions from theories that emphasize group-
level benefits. Post-Soviet collectives appear an appropriate
setting to test theories emphasizing group-level benefits. If
these collectives effectively restrict an individual’s ability to
achieve personal profit at the expense of the group, then
framing public goods games should increase cooperation.
However, closer inspection reveals that these institutions often
succeed or fail to the extent the collectives enable members
to build and maintain their own social networks, creating a
complex balance between individual incentives and common
benefits (Konstantinov 2002; Vladimirova 2006). These net-
works overlap imperfectly within collectives and extend be-
yond their boundaries, suggesting the appropriate arena for
investigating group-level benefits may not be the collectives
but the networks they sustain.
Perhaps debates over the relative role of individual-level
and group-level factors would be more productive if we fo-
cused on the different kinds of groups we expect to emerge
from competing theories. The definitions of “group” incor-
porated in recent models of group selection and cultural
group selection often depart from how that concept featured
in earlier theories of group selection (Okasha 2006). How
different definitions of a group relate to the networks, insti-
tutions, and social structures ethnographers study is an im-
portant line of inquiry. Whether one finds a preponderance
of evidence supporting one theory or another, both ap-
proaches emphasize the importance of positive assortment
among individuals who cooperate (Hamilton 1975; Henrich
2004). Different means of achieving positive assortment may
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lead to the emergence of different kinds of groups, some
closely resembling formal institutions like post-Soviet collec-
tives while others approximate social networks. This approach
would be interesting to pursue in tandem with Baumard’s
useful distinction between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” moti-
vations underlying cooperation. By investigating how these
two kinds of motivation drive forms of positive assortment
in different contexts (informal networks, formal institutions)
across small and large-scale cooperation, we may more pro-
ductively explore the limits of individual and group-level the-
ories.
My analysis of framing effects provides some methodolog-
ical insight on “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” motivations that is
useful for these theoretical debates. The shift toward strategies
of conditional cooperation in the framed games may indicate
that people understood the framed game as a context where
extrinsic motivations apply and the standard game as a con-
text where intrinsic motivations apply, as Baumard implies.
Our ability to document and understand this shift in strategies
and motivations rests on research designs that investigate the
relationship between actions and expectations. Theories of
cooperation often make assumptions about both actions and
expectations, but experiments with economic games rarely
analyze this relationship directly, focusing almost exclusively
on actions. In Kamchatka and elsewhere (Cronk 2007), the
fact that different strategies arise in response to the addition
of a single word to the game—as opposed to a change in the
cost-benefit structure or range of potential decisions—sug-
gests we need to be cautious when assuming that the structure
of a social dilemma in an experiment will apply in straight-
forward ways to naturally occurring contexts. Devoting more
attention to the relationship between actions and expectations
may allow researchers to document the range of strategies
evident in a particular place, or across contextual framings,
helping us strike the right balance between ecological validity
and external validity. These insights could help determine
what naturally occurring contexts we should (and should not)
expect to be associated with the experimental contexts of
different economic games. This approach could begin with
research in particular locations, extend to controlled com-
parisons on a regional level (as suggested by Barr, Cardenas,
Purzycki and Sosis), then build to more expansive cross-cul-
tural comparative research that investigates connections
among individual demographic and economic factors (Ziker),
personality (Heintz), and variations in social and ecological
contexts.
Post-Soviet Collectives
Several commentators (Barr, Cardenas, Purzycki and Sosis,
Wutich) reflect on the significance of framing effects for un-
derstanding people’s attitudes toward post-Soviet collectives
in Kamchatka. Barr asks if the struggles of these collectives
are tied to declines in cooperation within them. While the
collapse of government subsidies and the imperative to pri-
vatize did exacerbate existing tensions between private and
public benefits within these collectives, ethnographic research
in Siberia and other parts of the former Soviet Union aligns
better with Wutich’s observation about connections between
local institutions and macro-political and economic forces
(Humphrey 1998; Verdery 1996). Wutich makes the impor-
tant point that assessments of an institution’s successes and
failures should examine how broader social contexts of power
and authority limit or undermine an institution’s ability to
function (Agrawal 2003). The dramatic transformations as-
sociated with Soviet collectivization and post-Soviet privati-
zation in Kamchatka have been propelled primarily by these
macro-level forces, leaving people in the villages where I work
both disillusioned and nostalgic. The balance between these
attitudes toward collectives varies from one person to the next,
as well as across villages and regions, as Ziker knows from
his work in Siberia. My sense is the lower contributions in
framed games—caused by a shift toward strategies of con-
ditional cooperation and lowered expectations—are a result
of the scale tipping toward disillusionment for a small but
significant number of people. Whether this effect is, in
Tucker’s words, “cognitively accessible” during postgame in-
terviews is unclear, though people’s statements about collec-
tives were mostly positive. Cardenas wonders why no signif-
icant differences were found between frames that referred to
sovkhoz and obshchina collectives, considering these two in-
stitutions reflect different histories and ideologies. This is a
difficult question to answer conclusively. I would begin by
emphasizing that each collective still struggles to gain a foot-
hold in the post-Soviet economy. While contributions are
lower in each collective frame, this effect may arise from their
shared struggles, even if the nature of those struggles is unique
to each collective. Most people in the villages where I work
focus on how different collectives facilitate access to resources
that help them build and maintain their social networks,
rather than the ideologies associated with these collectives
(Ziker 2003). Purzycki and Sosis suggest we develop a scale
to measure how people value different collectives or expect
cooperation in different contexts. Their idea is one of many
interesting ways experimental and ethnographic methods
could be combined to support deeper explorations of external
and ecological validity, an area of research I hope will continue
to grow.
Methodology: Limitations and Opportunities
Some commentators express skepticism about what qualita-
tive interview data from postgame interviews can tell us about
quantitative data from economic games (Tucker, Heintz). I
share their sensitivity to distinguish between statements about
behavior and measures of behavior, but I suggest the value
of my interview data lies elsewhere. Had I chosen to conduct
structured postgame interviews, I might have been able to
discern quantifiable patterns in the responses and link these
to data from public goods games. However, this approach
runs the risk of precluding people’s opportunities to share
interpretations of the experiments and lived experiences that
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my questions do not anticipate. As Tucker notes, a strength
of semistructured interviews is that they can generate unex-
pected insights, leading to new research questions and ex-
perimental designs that more closely capture important as-
pects of life in Kamchatka. The idea that people in Kamchatka
conceptualize low contributions as signs of need rather than
selfishness is quite different from what most researchers con-
ducting economic games would assume. We would miss this
difference entirely without flexible methods for examining
how people explain their own actions and evaluate the actions
of others. In this respect, economic games are not so different
from established ethnographic methods like surveys and in-
terviews. Anthropologists have learned to relax and reinforce
the structure of these methods to achieve different goals,
whether facilitating comparative research or exploring par-
ticularities of people’s lived experiences. Tucker nicely cap-
tures the potential of this approach by describing economic
games as a participatory research method, and he has accom-
plished this in his own research (Tucker 2012). The data
produced by the primary exercise facilitate a number of sec-
ondary lines of inquiry as the researcher and participants
reflect on the shared experience and discuss its significance.
This approach to economic games has received comparatively
little attention, yet it is one anthropologists are ideally suited
to explore as part of interdisciplinary collaborative efforts
along the lines mentioned by Wutich and Cardenas (Anderies
et al. 2011; Cronk and Leech 2013; Poteete, Janssen, and
Ostrom 2010). My analysis of postgame interviews highlights
issues of internal validity raised by participants—such as
windfall effects and anonymity—that also concern many re-
searchers (Barr, Cardenas, Tucker), suggesting where our per-
spectives converge. However, the interviews also revealed rel-
atively novel factors—like perceptions of risk and attention
to signals of need—that have not been sufficiently addressed
by research with economic games. Moreover, people shared
experiences in postgame interviews that would not have
emerged without participating in the public goods game,
making the experiment an important tool for qualitative eth-
nographic work, regardless of the quantitative data it pro-
duced. An abductive, iterative, and recursive approach (Agar
2004b) that combines experiments with interviews and other
ethnographic methods, using the results of one to inform the
other, has great potential to enhance our understanding of
external and ecological validity and, in turn, to more effec-
tively develop and test theories of cooperation.
—Drew Gerkey
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